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ABSTRACT
Deep neural network (DNN) accelerators received considerable attention in past years due to saved energy
compared to mainstream hardware. Low-voltage operation of DNN accelerators allows to further reduce energy
consumption significantly, however, causes bit-level failures in the memory storing the quantized DNN weights.
In this paper, we show that a combination of robust fixed-point quantization, weight clipping, and random bit
error training (RANDBET) improves robustness against random bit errors in (quantized) DNN weights
significantly. This leads to high energy savings from both low-voltage operation as well as low-precision
quantization. Our approach generalizes across operating voltages and accelerators, as demonstrated on bit errors
from profiled SRAM arrays. We also discuss why weight clipping alone is already a quite effective way to
achieve robustness against bit errors. Moreover, we specifically discuss the involved trade-offs regarding accuracy,
robustness and precision: Without losing more than 1% in accuracy compared to a normally trained 8-bit DNN,
we can reduce energy consumption on CIFAR10 by 20%. Higher energy savings of, e.g., 30%, are possible at the
cost of 2.5% accuracy, even for 4-bit DNNs.
1 INTRODUCTION
Energy-efficiency is an important goal to lower carbon-
dioxide emissions of deep neural network (DNN) driven
applications and is a critical prerequisite to enable applica-
tions in edge computing. DNN accelerators, i.e., special-
ized hardware for inference, are used to reduce and limit
energy consumption alongside cost and space compared
to mainstream hardware, e.g., GPUs. These accelerators
generally feature on-chip SRAM used as scratchpads, e.g.,
to store DNN weights. Data access/movement constitutes
a dominant component of accelerator energy consumption
(Sze et al., 2017). Reduced precision (Lin et al., 2016) is
a widely used measure to reduce energy consumption at
the cost of approximate computing (Sampson et al., 2011).
Recently, DNN accelerators (Reagen et al., 2016; Kim et al.,
2018; Chandramoorthy et al., 2019) further lower memory
supply voltage to increase energy efficiency since dynamic
power varies quadratically with voltage. However, aggres-
sive SRAM supply voltage scaling, causes bit-level failures
in SRAM on account of process variation (Ganapathy et al.,
2017; Guo et al., 2009) with direct impact on the stored
DNN weights. The rate p of these errors increases exponen-
tially with lowered voltage and causes devastating drops in
DNN accuracy such that memory reliability becomes the
bottleneck in realizing low power DNN accelerators. In this
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paper, we aim to enable very low-voltage operation of DNN
accelerators by developing DNNs robust to such bit errors
in their weights, allowing DNN inference on “approximate
hardware” (Koppula et al., 2019; Sampson et al., 2011).
This is also desirable to improve security against adversar-
ial manipulation of voltage settings (Tang et al., 2017). In
general, robustness to bit errors in DNNs is a desirable goal
in order to maintain safe operation and should become a
standard performance metric in low power DNN design.
Fig. 1 shows the average bit error rates of SRAM arrays
as supply voltage is scaled below Vmin, i.e., the measured
lowest voltage at which there are no bit errors. Voltage
(x-axis) and energy (red, right y-axis) are normalized wrt.
Vmin and the energy per access at Vmin, respectively. DNNs
robust to a bit error rate (blue, left y-axis) of, e.g., p = 1%
allow to reduce SRAM energy by roughly 30%. To improve
DNN robustness to bit errors, we first consider the impact
of fixed-point quantization on robustness. While prior work
(Murthy et al., 2019; Merolla et al., 2016; Sung et al., 2015)
studies robustness to quantization, the impact of random
bit errors in quantized weights has not been considered so
far. We find that the choice of quantization scheme has
tremendous impact on robustness, even though accuracy is
not affected. In particular, we identify a particularly robust
quantization scheme, RQUANT in Fig. 2 (red). Addition-
ally, independent of the quantization scheme, we propose
aggressive weight clipping during training. This acts as
an explicit regularizer leading to spread out weight distri-
butions, improving robustness significantly, CLIPPING in
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Figure 1: Energy and Low-Voltage Operation. Average
bit error rate p (blue, left y-axis) from 32 14nm SRAM
arrays of size 512×64 from (Chandramoorthy et al., 2019)
and energy (red, right y-axis) vs. voltage (x-axis). Voltage is
normalized by Vmin, the minimal measured voltage for error-
free operation, as well as the energy per SRAM access at
Vmin. SRAM accesses have significant impact on the DNN
accelerator’s energy (Chen et al., 2016). Reducing voltage
leads to exponentially increasing bit error rates.
2018; Sung et al., 2015) ignoring weight outliers to reduce
quantization range, with sole focus of improving accuracy.
Common error correcting codes (ECCs such as SECDED),
cannot correct multiple bit errors per word (containing multi-
ple DNN weights). However, for p = 1%, the probability of
two or more bit errors in a 64-bit word is 13.5%. Error detec-
tion via redundancy (Reagen et al., 2016) or supply voltage
boosting (Chandramoorthy et al., 2019) allow error-free low-
voltage operation at the cost of additional energy or space.
Therefore, (Kim et al., 2018) proposes a co-design approach
of training DNNs on profiled SRAM bit errors. Similarly,
for approximate DRAMs, (Koppula et al., 2019) combines
profiled bit error training with a clever weight to DRAM
mapping. These approaches work as the spatial bit error
patterns can be assumed fixed for a fixed accelerator and
voltage. The bit error pattern is obtained by post-silicon pro-
filing and characterization of memories. The random nature
of variation-induced bit errors requires profiling to be car-
ried out for each voltage, memory array and individual chip
in order to obtain the corresponding bit error patterns. This
makes training DNNs on profiled bit error patterns an ex-
pensive process. More importantly, we demonstrate that the
obtained DNNs do not generalize across voltages or to un-
seen bit error patterns, e.g., from other memory arrays. We
propose random bit error training (RANDBET) which,
in combination with weight clipping and robust quantiza-
tion, obtains robustness against completely random bit error
patterns, see Fig. 2 (violet). Thereby, it generalizes across
chips and voltages, without any profiling, hardware-specific
data mapping or other circuit-level mitigation strategies.




























Figure 2: Robustness to Random Bit Errors. Robust test
error (test error after injecting bit errors, RErr, lower is
better ↓, y-axis) plotted against bit error rate p (x-axis).
Robustness to higher bit error rates allows more energy
efficient operation, cf. Fig. 1. For 8 bit, through robust
quantization (RQUANT, red), additionally weight clipping
(CLIPPING, blue) and finally adding random bit error train-
ing (RANDBET, violet) robustness improves significantly.
The Pareto optimal frontier is shown for 8 bit (black solid)
and 4 bit (dashed) quantization.
Contributions: We combine our robust fixed-point quan-
tization RQUANT, i.e., reduced quantization range and ro-
bust implementation, with weight clipping and random
bit error training (RANDBET) in order to obtain high
robustness against low-voltage induced, random bit errors.
We consider fixed-point quantization schemes in terms of
robustness and accuracy, instead of solely focusing on accu-
racy as related work. Furthermore, we show that aggressive
weight clipping, as regularization during training, is an ef-
fective strategy to improve robustness through redundancy.
In contrast to (Kim et al., 2018; Koppula et al., 2019), the
robustness obtained through RANDBET generalizes across
chips and voltages, as evaluated on profiled SRAM bit er-
ror patterns from (Chandramoorthy et al., 2019). Finally,
we discuss the involved trade-offs regarding robustness and
accuracy and make our code publicly available to facilitate
research in this highly applicable area of DNN robustness.
Fig. 2 highlights key results on CIFAR10: with 8 bit and an
increase in test error of less than 1%, roughly 20% energy
savings are possible. Combined with low-precision, e.g.,
for 4 bit quantization, 30% energy savings are possible at
p = 1% with an increase in error rate of less than 2.5%.
Outline: We review related work in Sec. 2 and provide a
detailed description and discussion of the considered low-
voltage bit error model in Sec. 3. In Sec. 4, we discuss fixed-
point quantization and its influence on bit error robustness
and present weight clipping and RANDBET as effective
strategies to improve robustness. Finally, Sec. 5 includes
our experimental results. We conclude in Sec. 6.
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Figure 3: Exemplary SRAM Bit Error Patterns. Measured bit errors from two chips with on-chip SRAM (left and right),
showing bit flip probability for a segment of size 64× 128 bits: yellow indicates a bit flip probability of one, violet indicates
zero probability. We show measurements corresponding to two supply voltages. With lower voltage, bit error rate increases.
Also, the bit errors for higher voltage (= lower bit error rate) are a subset of those for lower voltage (= higher rate), cf. Sec. 3.
Our error model randomly distributes bit errors across space. However, as example, we also show SRAM chip 2 which has a
different spatial distribution with bit errors distributed along columns. We aim to obtain robustness across different memory
arrays, voltages and allowing arbitrary DNN weight to memory mappings.
2 RELATED WORK
We review relevant prior work on quantization, low-voltage
induced random bit errors and weight robustness, in general.
Quantization: DNN Quantization (Guo, 2018) is usually
motivated by faster DNN inference, e.g., through fixed-point
quantization and arithmetic (Shin et al., 2017; Lin et al.,
2016; Li et al., 2017), and energy savings. To avoid reduced
accuracy, quantization is considered during training (Jacob
et al., 2018; Krishnamoorthi, 2018) instead of post-training
or with fine-tuning (Goncharenko et al., 2018; Banner et al.,
2019; nvt; ner), enabling low-bit quantization such as binary
DNNs (Rastegari et al., 2016; Courbariaux et al., 2015).
Some works also consider quantizing activations (Rastegari
et al., 2016; Choi et al., 2018; Hubara et al., 2017) or gra-
dients (Seide et al., 2014; Alistarh et al., 2016; Zhou et al.,
2016). While works such as (Murthy et al., 2019; Merolla
et al., 2016; Sung et al., 2015; Alizadeh et al., 2020) study
the robustness of DNNs to quantization, the robustness of
various quantization schemes against random bit errors has
not been studied. This is in stark contrast to our findings
that quantization impacts robustness significantly. Further-
more, works such as (Zhuang et al., 2018; Sung et al., 2015;
Park et al., 2018) clip weight outliers to reduce approxima-
tion error of inliers, improving accuracy. In contrast, we
consider weight clipping independent of quantization as reg-
ularization during training which spreads out the weight
distribution and improves robustness to bit errors.
Bit Errors in DNN Accelerators: Recent work (Ganapa-
thy et al., 2017; 2019) demonstrates that bit flips in SRAMs
increase exponentially when reducing voltage below Vmin.
The authors of (Chandramoorthy et al., 2019) study the im-
pact of bit flips in different layers of DNNs, showing severe
accuracy degradation. Similar observations hold for DRAM
(Chang et al., 2017). To prevent accuracy drops at low volt-
ages, (Reagen et al., 2016) combines SRAM fault detection
with logic to set faulty data reads to zero. (Chandramoorthy
et al., 2019) uses supply voltage boosting for SRAMs to
ensure error-free, low-voltage operation, while (Srinivasan
et al., 2016) proposes storing critical bits in specifically ro-
bust SRAM cells. However, such methods incur power and
area overhead. Thus, (Kim et al., 2018) and (Koppula et al.,
2019) propose co-design approaches combining training on
profiled SRAM/DRAM bit errors with hardware mitigation
strategies and clever weight to memory mapping. Besides
low-voltage operation for energy efficiency, recent work
(Tang et al., 2017) shows that an attacker can reduce voltage
maliciously. Similarly, works such as (Kim et al., 2014; Mur-
dock et al., 2020) demonstrate software-based approaches
to induce few, but targeted, bit flips in DRAM. In contrast
to (Kim et al., 2018; Koppula et al., 2019), our random
bit error training obtains robustness that generalizes across
chips and voltages without expensive chip-specific profiling
or hardware mitigation strategies. Furthermore, (Kim et al.,
2018; Koppula et al., 2019) do not address the role of quanti-
zation and we demonstrate that these approaches can benefit
from our weight clipping, as well. We show that energy
savings from low-voltage operation and low-precision (Park
et al., 2018) can be combined.
Weight Robustness: Only few works consider weight ro-
bustness: (Weng et al., 2020) certify the robustness of
weights with respect to L∞ perturbations and (Cheney et al.,
2017) study Gaussian noise on weights. (Rakin et al., 2019;
He et al., 2020) consider identifying and (adversarially)
flipping few vulnerable bits in quantized weights. Fault
tolerance, in contrast, describes structural changes such as
removed units, and is rooted in early work such as (Neti
et al., 1992; Chiu et al., 1994). Finally, (Ji et al., 2018;
Dumford & Scheirer, 2018) explicitly manipulate weights
in order to integrate backdoors. We study robustness against
random bit errors, which exhibit a quite special noise pattern
compared to L∞ or Gaussian noise, cf. Fig. 4.
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Figure 4: Quantization and Random Bit Errors. Original weights (x-axis) plotted against perturbed weights with bit
errors (y-axis), for different fixed-point quantization schemes with m = 8 bit (left) and p = 2.5%. We also show the m = 4
bit case with CLIPPING at wmax = 0.1, cf. Sec. 4.2. Color indicates absolute error: from zero violet to the maximal possible
error yellow of 1 (left) and 0.1 (right). Asymmetric per-layer quantization reduces the impact of bit errors compared to a the
symmetric per-layer/global quantization. Clipping reduces absolute error, but the errors relative to wmax increase.
3 LOW-VOLTAGE INDUCED RANDOM BIT
ERRORS IN QUANTIZED DNN WEIGHTS
We assume the quantized DNN weights to be stored on
multiple memory banks, e.g., SRAM in the case of on-chip
scratchpads or DRAM for off-chip memory. As shown in
(Ganapathy et al., 2017; Kim et al., 2018; Chandramoorthy
et al., 2019), the probability of memory bit cell failures in-
creases exponentially as operating voltage is scaled below
Vmin, i.e., the minimal voltage required for reliable opera-
tion, see Fig. 1. This is done intentionally to reduce energy
consumption, e.g., (Chandramoorthy et al., 2019; Kim et al.,
2018; Koppula et al., 2019), or adversarially by an attacker,
e.g., (Tang et al., 2017). Process variation during fabrication
causes a variation in the vulnerability of individual bit cells.
As shown in Fig. 3 (left), for a specific memory array, bit
cell failures are typically approximately random and inde-
pendent of each other (Ganapathy et al., 2017) even so chips
showing patterns with stronger dependencies are possible
Fig. 3 (right). Nevertheless, there is generally an “inherited”
distribution of bit cell failures across voltages: as described
in (Ganapathy et al., 2019), if a bit error occurred at a given
voltage, it is likely to occur at lower voltages, as made ex-
plicit in Fig. 3. However, across different SRAM arrays in a
chip or different chips, the patterns or spatial distribution of
bit errors is usually different and can be assumed random
(Chandramoorthy et al., 2019). Throughout the paper, we
use the following bit error model:
Random Bit Error Model: The probability of a bit error is
p (in %) for all weight values and bits. For a fixed memory
array, bit errors are persistent across supply voltages, i.e.,
bit errors at probability p′≤p also occur at probability p. A
bit error flips the currently stored bit. We denote random bit
error injection by BErrp.
This error model realistically captures the nature of low-
voltage induced bit errors, from both SRAM and DRAM as
confirmed in (Chandramoorthy et al., 2019; Kim et al., 2018;
Koppula et al., 2019). However, our approach in Sec. 4 is
model-agnostic: the error model can be refined if extensive
memory characterization results are available for individual
chips. For example, faulty bit cells with 1-to-0 or 0-to-1 flips
might not be equally likely. Similarly, as in (Koppula et al.,
2019), bit errors might be biased towards alignment along
rows or columns of the memory array. The latter case is illus-
trated in Fig. 3 (right). However, estimating these specifics
requires testing infrastructure and detailed characterization
of individual chips. More importantly, it introduces the risk
of overfitting to few specific memories/chips. Furthermore,
we demonstrate that the robustness obtained using our uni-
form error model generalizes to bit error distributions with
strong spatial biases as in Fig. 3 (right).
We assume the quantized weights to be mapped linearly
to the memory. This is the most direct approach and, in
contrast to (Koppula et al., 2019), does not require knowl-
edge of the exact spatial distribution of bit errors. This also
means that we do not map particularly vulnerable weights
to more reliable memory cells, and therefore no changes
to the hardware or the application are required. Thus, in
practice, for W weights and m bits per weight value, we
sample uniformly u ∼ U(0, 1)W×m. Then, the j-th bit in
the quantized weight vi = Q(wi) is flipped iff uij ≤ p.
Our model assumes that the flipped bits at lower probability
p′ ≤ p are a subset of the flipped bits at probability p and
that bit flips to 1 and 0 are equally likely. The noise pattern
of random bit errors is illustrated in Fig. 4: for example
a single bit flip in the most-significant bit (MSB) of the
signed integer vi can result in a change of roughly half of
the quantized range (also cf. Sec. 4.1).
4 TOWARDS ROBUSTNESS AGAINST
RANDOM BIT ERRORS
We address robustness against random bit errors in three
steps: First, we analyze the impact of fixed-point quan-
tization schemes on bit error robustness. This has been
neglected both in prior work on low-voltage DNN acceler-
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Figure 5: Random Bit Error Training (RANDBET). We illustrate the data-flow for RANDBET as in Alg. 1. Here, BErrp
injects random bit errors in the quantized weights v(t) = Q(w(t)), resulting in ṽ(t), while the forward pass is performed on
the de-quantized perturbed weights w̃(t)q = Q−1(ṽ(t)), i.e., fixed-point arithmetic is not emulated. The weight update during
training is not affected by bit errors and computed in floating point.
ators (Kim et al., 2018; Koppula et al., 2019) and in work
on quantization robustness (Murthy et al., 2019; Merolla
et al., 2016; Sung et al., 2015). This yields our robust
quantization (Sec. 4.1). On top, we propose aggressive
weight clipping as regularization during training (Sec. 4.2).
Weight clipping enforces a more uniformly distributed, i.e.,
redundant, weight distribution, improving robustness. We
show that this is due to minimizing the cross-entropy loss,
enforcing large logit differences. Finally, in addition to ro-
bust quantization and weight clipping, we perform random
bit error training (RANDBET) (Sec. 4.3): in contrast to
the fixed bit error patterns in (Kim et al., 2018; Koppula
et al., 2019), we train on completely random bit errors and,
thus, generalize across chips and voltages. Generalization
is measured using average robust test error (RErr), the test
error after injecting bit errors, wrt. to our error model from
Sec. 3 as well as real, profiled bit error patterns. Robustness
against bit error rate p has to induce robustness for p′ ≤ p
(i.e., higher voltage), as well.
4.1 Robust Fixed-Point Quantization
We consider quantization-aware training (Jacob et al., 2018;
Krishnamoorthi, 2018) using a generic, deterministic fixed-
point quantization scheme commonly used in DNN acceler-
ators (Chandramoorthy et al., 2019). However, we focus on
the impact of quantization schemes on robustness against
random bit errors, mostly neglected so far (Murthy et al.,
2019; Merolla et al., 2016; Sung et al., 2015). We find
that quantization affects robustness significantly, even if
accuracy is largely unaffected.
Fixed-Point Quantization: Let f(x;w) be a DNN taking
an example x ∈ [0, 1]D, e.g., an image, and weights w ∈
RW as input. Quantization determines how weights are rep-
resented in memory, e.g., on SRAM. In a fixed-point quanti-
zation scheme, m bits allow to represent 2m distinct values.
A weight wi ∈ [−qmax, qmax] is represented by a signed
m-bit integer vi = Q(wi) corresponding to the underlying
bits. Here, [−qmax, qmax] is the symmetric quantization range
and signed integers use two’s complement representation.






, Q−1(vi) = ∆vi, ∆ =
qmax
2m−1 − 1 (1)
Flipping the most significant bit (MSB, i.e., sign bit) leads
to an absolute error of half the quantization range, i.e., qmax
(yellow in Fig. 4). Flipping the least significant bit (LSB)
incurs an error of ∆, cf. Eq. (1). Thus, the impact of bit
errors “scales with” qmax.
Global and Per-Layer Quantization: qmax can be chosen
to accommodate all weights, i.e., qmax = maxi |wi|. This is
called global quantization. However, it has become standard
to apply quantization per-layer allowing to adapt qmax to
each layer. As in PyTorch (Paszke et al., 2017), we consider
weights and biases of each layer separately. By reducing
the quantization range for each layer individually, the er-
rors incurred by bit flips are automatically minimized, cf.
Fig. 4. The per-layer, symmetric quantization is our de-
fault reference, referred to as NORMAL. However, it turns
out that it is further beneficial to consider arbitrary quanti-
zation ranges [qmin, qmax] (allowing qmin > 0). In practice,
we first map [qmin, qmax] to [−1, 1] and then quantize [−1, 1]
using Eq. (1). Overall, per-layer asymmetric quantization
has the finest granularity, i.e., lowest ∆ and approximation
error. Nevertheless it is not the most robust quantization.
Robust Quantization: Quantization as in Eq. (1) does not
provide optimal robustness against bit errors. First, the
floor operation bwi/∆c is commonly implemented as float-
to-integer conversion. Using proper rounding dwi/∆c in-
stead has negligible impact on accuracy, even though ap-
proximation error improves slightly. In stark contrast, bit
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Figure 6: Effect of Weight Clipping. On CIFAR10, weight
clipping constraints the weights (right), thereby implicitly
limiting the possible range for logits (left, blue). However,
even for wmax = 0.1 the DNN is able to produce high
confidences (middle, blue), suggesting that more weights
are used to obtain these logits. Furthermore, the impact of
random bit errors, p = 1%, on the logits/confidences (red)
is reduced significantly. RANDBET (trained with p = 1%,
w/o weight clipping), increases the range of weights and is
less effective at preserving logit/confidence distribution.
error robustness is improved considerably. During train-
ing, DNNs can compensate the differences in approxima-
tion errors, even for small precision m < 8. However,
at test time, rounding decreases the impact of bit errors
considerably. Second, Eq. (1) uses signed integers for sym-
metric quantization. For asymmetric quantization, with
arbitrary [qmin, qmax], we found quantization into unsigned
integers to improve robustness, i.e., Q : [qmin, qmax] 7→
{0, . . . , 2m − 1}. This is implemented using an additive
term of 2m−1− 1 in Eq. (1). While accuracy is not affected,
the effect of bit errors in the sign bit changes: in symmet-
ric quantization, the sign bit mirrors the sign of the weight
value. For asymmetric quantization, an unsigned integer
representation is more meaningful. Overall, our robust
fixed-point quantization (RQUANT) uses per-layer, asym-
metric quantization into unsigned integers with rounding.
These seemingly small differences have little to no impact
on accuracy, while having tremendous impact on robustness
against bit errors, see Sec. 5.1 and App. D.
4.2 Training with Weight Clipping as Regularization
Weight clipping refers to constraining the weights to
[−wmax, wmax] during training, where wmax is a hyper-
parameter. Generally, wmax is independent of the quanti-
zation range(s) which always adapt(s) to the weight range(s)
at hand. However, weight clipping limits the maximum
possible quantization range (cf. Sec. 4.1), i.e., qmax ≤ wmax.
It might seem that weight clipping with small wmax automat-
ically improves robustness against bit errors as the absolute
errors are reduced. However, the relative errors are not
Algorithm 1 Random Bit Error Training (RANDBET).
The forward passes are performed using de-quantized
weights (blue). Perturbed weights are obtained by injecting
bit errors in the quantized weights (in red). The update,
averaging gradients from both forward passes, is performed
in floating-point (magenta). Also see Fig. 5.
1: procedure RANDBET(p)
2: initialize w(0)
3: for t = 0, . . . , T − 1 do
4: sample batch {(xb, yb)}Bb=1
5: {element-wise clipping:}
6: w(t) = min(wmax,max(−wmax, w(t)))
7: {quantization:}
8: v(t) = Q(w(t))
9: w(t)q = Q−1(v(t))
10: {clean forward and backward pass:}





12: {perturbed forward and backward pass:}
13: w̃(t)q =Q−1(BErrp(v(t))) {inject random bit errors}





15: {average gradients and weight update:}
16: w(t+1) = w(t) − γ(∆(t) + ∆̃(t))
17: return w(T )q = Q−1(Q(w(T )))
influenced by rescaling. As the DNN’s decision is usually
invariant to rescaling, reducing the scale of the weights
does not impact robustness. In fact, the mean relative er-
ror of the weights in Fig. 4 (right) increased with clipping
at wmax = 0.1. Thus, weight clipping does not “trivially”
improve robustness by reducing the scale of weights. Nev-
ertheless, we found that weight clipping actually improves
robustness considerably on top of our robust quantization.
The interplay of weight clipping and minimizing the the
cross-entropy loss during training is the key. High con-
fidences can only be achieved by large differences in the
logits. Because the weights are limited to [−wmax, wmax],
large logits can only be achieved using more weights in each
layer to produce larger outputs. This is illustrated in Fig. 6
(right): using wmax = 0.1, the weights are (depending on
the layer) up to 5 times smaller. Considering deep NNs, the
“effective” scale factor for the logits is significantly larger,
scaling exponentially with the number of layers. Thus, using
wmax = 0.1 is a significant constraint on the DNNs ability
to produce large logits. As result, weight clipping produces
a much more uniform weight distribution. Fig. 6 (left and
middle) shows that a DNN constrained at wmax = 0.1 can
produce similar logit and confidence distributions (in blue)
as the unclipped DNN. At the same time, random bit er-
rors, have a significantly smaller impact on the logits and
confidences (in red). Fig. 6 (right column) also shows the
induced redundancy in the weight distribution. Weight clip-
ping leads to more weights being utilized, i.e., less weights
are zero (note log-scale, marked in red, on the y-axis). Also,
Bit Error Robustness for Energy-Efficient DNN Accelerators
more weights reach large values, relative to the maximum
absolute weight. Overall, we found weight clipping to be
an easy-to-use but effective measure to improve weight ro-
bustness. We use CLIPPINGwmax=0.1 to refer to, e.g., weight
clipping with wmax = 0.1. For more evidence supporting
our argumentation, see Tab. 2. For example, we show that
DNNs loose robustness when using label smoothing, i.e.,
not enforcing high confidences/logits during training.
4.3 Random Bit Error Training (RANDBET)
In addition to weight clipping and robust quantization, we
inject random bit errors with probability p during training
to further improve robustness. This results in the following
learning problem, which we optimize as illustrated in Fig. 5:
minw E[L(f(x; w̃), y) + L(f(x;w), y)]
s.t. v = Q(w), ṽ = BErrp(v), w̃ = Q−1(ṽ).
(2)
where (x, y) are labeled examples, L is the cross-entropy
loss and v = Q(w) denotes the (element-wise) quantized
weights w which are to be learned. BErrp(v) injects random
bit errors with rate p in v. Note that we consider both the
loss on clean weights and weights with bit errors. This is
desirable to avoid an increase in (clean) test error and sta-
bilizes training compared to training only on bit errors in
the weights. Note that bit error rate p implies, in expecta-
tion, pmW bit errors. Following Alg. 1, we use stochastic
gradient descent to optimize Eq. (2), by performing the gra-
dient computation using the perturbed weights w̃ = Q−1(ṽ)
with ṽ = BErrp(v), while applying the gradient update
on the (floating-point) clean weights w. In spirit, this is
similar to data augmentation, however, the perturbation is
applied on the weights instead of the inputs. As we found
that introducing bit errors right from the start may prevent
the DNN from converging, we apply bit errors as soon as
the (clean) cross-entropy loss is below 1.75. Interestingly,
weight clipping and RANDBET have somewhat orthogonal
effects, which allows to combine them easily in practice:
While weight clipping encourages redundancy in weights
by constraining them to [−wmax, wmax], RANDBET (w/o
weight clipping) causes the DNN to have larger tails in the
weight distribution, as shown in Fig. 6 (bottom). However,
considering logits and confidences, especially with random
bit errors (in red), RANDBET alone performs slightly worse
than CLIPPING0.1. Thus, RANDBET becomes particularly
effective when combined with weight clipping, as we make
explicit using the notation RANDBETwmax and in Alg. 1.
5 EXPERIMENTS
We present experiments on MNIST (LeCun et al., 1998)
and CIFAR (Krizhevsky, 2009). We first analyze the im-
pact of fixed-point quantization schemes on robustness
(Sec. 5.1). Subsequently, we discuss weight clipping
Table 1: Quantization Robustness. RErr for random bit
errors at p = 0.05% and p = 0.5% for normal training with
different quantization schemes discussed in Sec. 4.1. Minor
differences can have large impact on RErr while clean test
error is largely unaffected. For 8 bit the second row shows
NORMAL quantization (symmetric/per-layer) whereas the
last row is our RQUANT. For 4 bits we show CLIPPING0.1








Eq. (1), global 4.63 86.01 ±3.65 90.71 ±0.49
Eq. (1), per-layer 4.36 5.51 ±0.19 24.76 ±4.71
+asymmetric 4.36 6.47 ±0.22 40.78 ±7.56
+unsigned 4.42 6.97 ±0.28 17.00 ±2.77
+rounding (=RQUANT) 4.32 5.10 ±0.13 11.28 ±1.47
4
bi
t w/o rounding* 5.81 90.40 ±0.21 90.36 ±0.2
w/ rounding* 5.29 5.75 ±0.06 7.71 ±0.36
(CLIPPING, Sec. 5.2), showing that improved robustness
originates from increased redundancy in the weight dis-
tribution. Then, we focus on random bit error training
(RANDBET, Sec. 5.3). We show that related work (Kim
et al., 2018; Koppula et al., 2019) does not generalize, while
RANDBET generalizes across chips and voltages, as demon-
strated on profiled bit error patterns from different chips.
Sec. 5.4 summarizes our results for various precisions m.
Metrics: We report (clean) test error Err (lower is better,
↓), corresponding to clean weights, and robust test error
RErr (↓) which is the test error after injecting bit errors
into the weights. As the bit errors are random we report
the average RErr and its standard deviation for 50 samples
of random bit errors with rate p as detailed in Sec. 3.
Architecture: We use SimpleNet (HasanPour et al., 2016),
providing comparable performance to ResNets (He et al.,
2016) with only W=5.5Mio weights on CIFAR10. On
MNIST, we halve all channel widths, resulting in roughly
1Mio weights. On CIFAR100, we use a Wide ResNet
(WRN) (Zagoruyko & Komodakis, 2016) with group nor-
malization (GN) (Wu & He, 2018). Batch normalization
(BN) (Ioffe & Szegedy, 2015) works as well but models
using BN yield consistently worse robustness against bit
errors, see App. G.1 for a discussion.
Training: We use stochastic gradient descent with an ini-
tial learning rate of 0.05, multiplied by 0.1 after 2/5, 3/5
and 4/5 of 100/250 epochs on MNIST/CIFAR. On CIFAR,
we whiten the input images and use AutoAugment (Cubuk
et al., 2018) with Cutout (Devries & Taylor, 2017). For
RANDBET, random bit error injection starts when the loss
is below 1.75 on MNIST/CIFAR10 or 3.5 on CIFAR100.
Normal training with the standard and our robust quanti-
zation are denoted NORMAL and RQUANT, respectively.
Weight clipping with wmax is referred to as CLIPPINGwmax or
together with RANDBET as RANDBETwmax . For RQUANT,
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Table 2: Weight Clipping Robustness. Clean Err and RErr
as well as clean confidence and confidence at p=1% bit er-
rors (in %, higher is better, ↑) for CLIPPING and CLIPPING
with label smoothing (+LS). Err increases for wmax = 0.025
where the DNN is not able to produce large (clean) con-
fidences. LS consistently reduces robustness, indicating
that robustness is due to enforcing high confidence during









RQUANT 4.32 97.42 78.43 5.54 32.05
CLIPPING0.15 4.42 96.90 88.41 5.31 13.08
CLIPPING0.1 4.82 96.66 92.97 5.58 8.93
CLIPPING0.05 5.44 95.90 94.73 5.90 7.18
CLIPPING0.025 7.10 84.69 83.28 7.40 8.18
CLIPPING0.15 +LS 4.67 88.22 47.55 5.83 29.40
CLIPPING0.1 +LS 4.82 87.90 78.89 6.10 10.59
CLIPPING0.05 +LS 5.30 87.41 85.04 6.43 7.30
m = 8, we obtain 4.3% on CIFAR10 and 18.5% Err on CI-
FAR100. On MNIST, 0.47% are possible even for m = 2.
Our appendix includes implementation details (App. D),
more information on our experimental setup (App. F), and
complementary experiments (App. G). Among others, we
discuss the robustness of BN (App. G.1), other architectures
such as ResNet-50 (App. G.1), qualitative results for CLIP-
PING (App. G.3) and complete results for m = 4, 3, 2 bits
precision (App. G.8). Also, we discuss a simple guarantee
how the average RErr relates to the true expected robust
error (App. C.2). Our code will be made publicly available.
5.1 Quantization Choice Impacts Robustness
Quantization schemes affect robustness significantly, even
when not affecting accuracy. For example, Tab. 1 shows
that per-layer quantization reduces RErr significantly for
small bit error rates, e.g., p = 0.05%. While asymmetric
quantization further reduces the quantization range, RErr
increases, especially for large bit error rates, e.g., p = 0.5%
(marked in red). This is despite Fig. 4 showing a slightly
smaller impact of bit errors. This is caused by an asymmet-
ric quantization into signed integers: Bit flips in the most
significant bit (MSB, i.e., sign bit) are not meaningful if the
quantized range is not symmetric as the sign bit does not re-
flect the sign of the represented weight value, see App. G.2.
Similarly, replacing integer conversion of wi/∆ by proper
rounding, dwi/∆c, reduces RErr significantly (resulting in
our RQUANT). This becomes particularly important for
m = 4. Here, rounding also improves clean Err slightly, but
the effect is significantly less pronounced. Proper rounding
generally reduces the approximation error of the quantiza-
tion scheme. These errors are magnified when considering
bit errors at test time, even though DNNs can compensate
such differences during training to achieve good accuracy,
Table 3: Fixed Pattern Bit Error Training. RErr for
training on an entirely fixed bit error pattern (PATTBET).
Top: Evaluation on the same pattern; PATTBET trained
on p = 2.5% does not generalize to p = 1% even though
the bit errors for p = 1% are a subset of those seen during
training for p = 2.5% (in red). Bottom: PATTBET also
fails to generalize to completely random bit errors. This can
be confirmed on real, profiled bit errors in App. G.5.
Model (CIFAR10) RErr in %, p in %
Evaluation on Fixed Pattern p=1 p=2.5
PATTBET p=2.5 14.14 7.87
PATTBET0.15 p=2.5 8.50 7.41
Evaluation on Random Patterns p=1 p=2.5
PATTBET0.15 p=2.5 12.09 61.59
i.e., low Err. Form = 4 or lower, we also found weight clip-
ping to help training, obtaining lower Err. Overall, we show
that random bit errors induce unique error distributions, cf.
Fig. 4 in DNN weights, heavily dependent on details of the
employed fixed-point quantization scheme. We think that
robustness against bit errors should become an important
criterion for the design of DNN quantization. While our
RQUANT performs fairly well, finding an “optimal” robust
quantization scheme is an interesting open problem.
5.2 Weight Clipping Improves Robustness
While the quantization range adapts to the weight range after
every update during training, weight clipping explicitly con-
straints the weights to [−wmax, wmax]. Tab. 2 shows the ef-
fect of different wmax for CIFAR10 with 8 bit precision. The
clean test error is not affected for CLIPPINGwmax=0.15 but
one has already strong robustness improvements for p = 1%
compared to RQUANT (RErr of 13.18% vs 32.05%). Fur-
ther reducing wmax leads to a slow increase in clean Err and
decrease in average clean confidence, while significantly
improving RErr to 7.18% for p = 1% at wmax = 0.05.
For wmax = 0.025 the DNN is no longer able to achieve
high confidence (marked in red) which leads to stronger
loss of clean Err. Interestingly, the gap between clean and
perturbed confidences under bit errors for p = 1% is (al-
most) monotonically decreasing. These findings generalize
to other datasets and precisions, see App. G.8. However, for
low precision m ≤ 4 the effects are stronger as RQUANT
alone does not yield any robust models and weight clipping
is essential for achieving robustness.
As discussed in Sec. 4.2 the robustness of the DNN origi-
nates in the cross-entropy loss enforcing high confidences on
the training set and, thus, large logits while weight clipping
works against having large logits. Therefore, the network
has to utilize more weights with larger absolute values (com-
pared to wmax). In order to test this hypothesis, we limit the
confidences that need to be achieved via label smoothing
(Szegedy et al., 2016), targeting 0.9 for the true class and
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Table 4: Random Bit Error Training (RANDBET). Aver-
age RErr (and standard deviation) of RANDBET evaluated
at various bit error rates p and usingm = 8 or 4 bit precision.
For low p, weight clipping provides sufficient robustness.
However for p ≥ 0.5, RANDBET increases robustness








RQUANT 4.32 11.28 ±1.47 32.05 ±6 68.65 ±9.23
CLIPPING 4.82 6.95 ±0.24 8.93 ±0.46 12.22 ±1.29
RANDBET p=0.1 4.72 6.74 ±0.29 8.53 ±0.58 11.40 ±1.27
RANDBET p=1 4.90 6.36 ±0.17 7.41 ±0.29 8.65 ±0.37
4
bi
t CLIPPING 5.29 7.71 ±0.36 10.62 ±1.08 15.79 ±2.54
RANDBET p=1 5.39 7.04 ±0.21 8.34 ±0.42 9.77 ±0.81
0.1/9 for the other classes. According to Sec. 4.2, this should
lead to less robustness, as the DNN has to use “less” weights.
Indeed, in Tab. 2, RErr at p = 1% increases from 13.08%
for CLIPPING0.15 to 29.4% when using label smoothing
(marked in blue). Moreover, the difference between average
clean and perturbed confidence is significantly larger for
DNNs trained with label smoothing.
In App. G.3 we show that robustness against bit errors also
leads to robustness against L∞ perturbations which gener-
ally affect all weights in contrast to random bit errors, and
provide more qualitative results about the change of the
weight distribution induced by clipping in Fig. 10.
5.3 RANDBET Yields Generalizable Robustness
Training on Profiled Errors Does Not Generalize: Co-
design approaches such as (Kim et al., 2018; Koppula et al.,
2019) combine training DNNs on profiled SRAM or DRAM
bit errors with hardware-approaches to limit the errors’ im-
pact. However, profiling SRAM or DRAM requires ex-
pensive infrastructure, expert knowledge and time. More
importantly, training on profiled bit errors does not general-
ize to previously unseen bit error distributions (e.g., other
chips or voltages): Tab. 3 (top) shows RErr of PATTBET,
i.e., pattern-specific bit error training. The main problem is
that PATTBET does not even generalize to lower bit error
rates (i.e., higher voltages) of the same pattern as trained
on (marked in red). This is striking as, following Fig. 3,
the bit errors form a subset of the bit errors seen during
training: training with p = 2.5% bit errors does not provide
robustness for p = 1%, RErr increases 7.9% to 14.1%. It
is not surprising, that Tab. 3 (bottom) also demonstrates
that PATTBET does not generalize to random bit error pat-
terns: RErr increases from 7.4% to 61.6% at p = 2.5%.
The same observations can be made when training on real,
profiled bit errors corresponding to the chips in Fig. 3, see
App. G.5. Overall, obtaining robustness that generalizes
across voltages and chips is crucial for low-voltage opera-
tion to become practical.
Table 5: Generalization to Profiled Bit Errors. RErr for
RANDBET on two different profiled chips. The bit error
rates differ across chips due to measurements at different
voltages, also see Fig. 3. Chip 2 exhibits a bit error distribu-
tion significantly different from uniform random bit errors:
bit errors are strongly aligned along columns and biased
towards 0-to-1 flips, cf. Fig. 3. Nevertheless, RANDBET
generalizes surprisingly well.
Chip (Fig. 3) Model (CIFAR10) RErr in %
Chip 1 p≈0.86 p≈2.75
RANDBET0.05 p=1.5 7.04 9.37
Chip 2 p≈0.14 p≈1.08
RANDBET0.05 p=1.5 6.00 9.00
RANDBET Improves Robustness Our RANDBET, com-
bined with weight clipping, further improves robustness and
additionally generalizes across chips and voltages. Tab. 4
shows results for weight clipping and RANDBET with
wmax = 0.1 and m = 8, 4 bits precision. RANDBET
is particularly effective against large bit error rates, e.g.,
p = 1.5%, reducing RErr from 12.22% to 8.65% (m = 8
bits). The effect is pronounced for 4 bits or even lower pre-
cision, where models are generally less robust. The optimal
combination of weight clipping and RANDBET depends
on the bit error rate. For example, in Tab. 2, lowering wmax
to 0.05 reduces RErr below RANDBET0.1 with p=1% for
some bit error rates. We also emphasize that RANDBET
generalizes to lower bit errors than trained on, in stark con-
trast to the fixed-pattern training PATTBET. In App. G.7,
we also show that RANDBET works on other architectures
such as ResNet-50. On other datasets, e.g.,MNIST, RAND-
BET allows to operate at p = 12.5% bit error rate with
0.9% RErr and only m = 2 bits. At this point, weight
clipping alone yields 90% RErr.
RANDBET Generalizes to Profiled Bit Errors: RAND-
BET also generalizes to bit errors profiled from real chips,
corresponding to Fig. 3. Tab. 5 shows results on the two
profiled chips of Fig. 3. Profiling was done at various volt-
age levels, resulting in different bit error rates for each chip.
To simulate various weights to memory mappings, we apply
various offsets before linearly mapping weights to the pro-
filed SRAM arrays. Tab. 5 reports average RErr, showing
that RANDBET generalizes quite well to these profiled bit
errors. Regarding chip 1, RANDBET performs very well,
even for large p ≈ 2.75, as the bit error distribution of chip
1 largely matches our error model in Sec. 3, cf. Fig. 3 (left).
In contrast, with chip 2 we picked a more difficult bit error
distribution which is strongly aligned along columns, po-
tentially hitting many MSBs simultaneously. Thus, RErr
increases for chip 2 even for a lower bit error rate p ≈ 1.08
(marked in red) but energy savings are still possible without
degrading prediction performance.
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Best for: m=8, 4, 3, 2 bits Normal RQuant +Clipping +RandBET ( All Models)
Figure 7: Bit Error Robustness on CIFAR10, CIFAR100 and MNIST. Average RErr plotted against bit error rate p, both
in %. We considered various models (in • gray), corresponding to different wmax and p during training. We explicitly plot the
best model for each bit error rate: for NORMAL (orange), RQUANT (red), CLIPPING (blue) and RANDBET (violet). Note
that these might correspond to different wmax and p (also across datasets). Across all approaches, we plot the per-error-rate
best model in black: for m = 8, 4, 3, 2 bits, depending on dataset. For 8 bit and low bit error rates, CLIPPING is often
sufficient. However, for 4 bit or higher bit error rates, RANDBET is crucial to keep RErr low.
5.4 Summary and Discussion
Our experiments are summarized in Fig. 7. We con-
sider NORMAL quantization vs. our robust quantization
RQUANT, various CLIPPING and RANDBET models with
different wmax and p during training (indicated in • gray)
and plot RErr against bit error rate p at test time. On all
datasets RQUANT outperforms NORMAL. On CIFAR10
(left), RErr increases significantly for RQUANT (red) start-
ing at p ≈ 0.25% bit error rate. While CLIPPING (blue)
generally reduces RErr, only RANDBET (violet) can keep
RErr around 6% or lower for a bit error rate of p ≈ 0.5%.
The best model for each bit error rate p (black and solid
for m = 8) might vary. CIFAR100 is generally more diffi-
cult, while significantly higher bit error rates are possible on
MNIST. On CIFAR10, RErr increases slightly for m = 4.
However, for m = 3, 2 RErr increases more significantly
as clean Err increases by 1− 2%. Nevertheless, RErr only
increases slightly for larger bit error rates p. It remains fu-
ture work whether RANDBET with a more sophisticated
(but robust) quantization scheme can enable low-voltage
operation even for m = 2 bits. In all cases, RErr increases
monotonically, ensuring safe operation at higher voltages.
The best trade-off between robustness and accuracy depends
on the application: higher energy savings require a larger
“sacrifice” in terms of RErr. Finally, App. C.2 provides a
confidence-interval based guarantee on how strongly RErr
is expected to deviate from the empirical results in Fig. 7.
Overall, the results in Fig. 7 enable robust low-voltage op-
eration without requiring expensive error correcting codes
(ECCs) or other circuit techniques (Reagen et al., 2016;
Chandramoorthy et al., 2019). Furthermore, our analysis
applies both to DRAM, commonly off-chip, and SRAM,
usually used as scratchpads on-chip of DNN accelerators.
Compared to co-design (Kim et al., 2018; Koppula et al.,
2019), we do not require expensive expert knowledge or pro-
filing infrastructure. Moreover, RANDBET improves over
these approaches by generalizing across chips and voltages.
Besides RANDBET, we show that robust fixed-point quan-
tization only with weight clipping can provide reasonable
robustness, e.g., for p = 0.1% on CIFAR10. This is without
sophisticated quantization scheme, e.g., with special treat-
ment for outliers (Zhuang et al., 2018; Sung et al., 2015;
Park et al., 2018), and complementary to (Murthy et al.,
2019; Merolla et al., 2016; Sung et al., 2015; Alizadeh et al.,
2020), focusing merely on robustness to quantization.
6 CONCLUSION
We propose a combination of robust quantization, weight
clipping and random bit error training (RANDBET) to
get DNNs robustness against random bit errors in their
(quantized) weights, enabling low-voltage operation of
DNN accelerators to save energy. Here, the accelerator
memory is operated far below its rated voltage (Chan-
dramoorthy et al., 2019; Koppula et al., 2019; Kim et al.,
2018), inducing exponentially increasing rates of bit errors,
directly affecting stored DNN weights. Weight clipping
regularizes the weights to a small [−wmax, wmax] during
training, encouraging redundancy and increasing robustness.
RANDBET further generalizes across chips, with different
bit error patterns, and voltages without requiring expensive
memory profiling or hardware mitigation strategies. These
are important criteria for low-voltage operation in practice.
Besides, we also discuss the impact of fixed-point quanti-
zation schemes on robustness, which has been neglected
in prior work. We are able to train low-precision DNNs
robust to significant rates of random bit errors which allow
a reduction in energy consumption of roughly 20% or more
on MNIST and CIFAR.
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Overall bit flips = 1-to-0 flips + 0-to-1 flips stuck-at-1 errors
Figure 8: Low-Voltage Induced Bit Errors on Profiled Chips. Complementary to Fig. 3, we break the the bit error
distribution of chips 1 and 2 down into 1-to-0 and 0-to-1 bit flips. Additionally, we show that most of the bit errors are
actually stuck-at-errors and, thus, not subject to randomness. As before, we show a sub-array of size 64 × 128 from all
profiled bit cells (i.e., across all SRAM arrays). Sec. A includes details on profiling.
A ENERGY SAVINGS IN FIG. 1
Fig. 1 shows bit error rate characterization results of SRAMs
in the DNN accelerator chip described in (Chandramoorthy
et al., 2019), fabricated using 14nm FinFET technology.
The average bit error rate is measured from 32 SRAMs,
each SRAM array of size 4KB (512 × 64 bit), as supply
voltage is scaled down. Bit error rate p (in %) at a given
supply voltage is measured as the count of read or write bit
cell failures averaged over the total number of bit cells in
the SRAM. A bit cell failure refers to reading 1 on writing
0 or reading 0 on writing 1. For a more comprehensive
characterization of SRAMs in 14nm technology, the reader
is referred to (Ganapathy et al., 2017). Fig. 1 also shows the
energy per write and read access of a 4KB (512 × 64 bit)
SRAM, obtained from Cadence Spectre simulations. Energy
is obtained at the same constant clock frequency at all supply
voltages. The voltage (x-axis) shown is normalized over
Vmin which is the lowest measured voltage at which there are
no bit cell failures. Energy shown in the graph (secondary
axis on the right) is also normalized over the energy per
access at Vmin.
Accelerators such as (Chen et al., 2016; 2014; Chandramoor-
thy et al., 2019; Reagen et al., 2016; nvd; Du et al., 2015;
Sharma et al., 2018) have a large amount of on-chip SRAM
to store weights and intermediate computations. Total dy-
namic energy of accelerator SRAMs can be obtained as the
total number of SRAM accesses times the energy of a single
SRAM access. Optimized dataflow in accelerators leads to
better re-use of weights read from memories in computa-
tion, reducing the number of such memory accesses (Chen
et al., 2016; 2014; nvd). Low voltage operation focuses on
reducing the memory access energy, leading to significant
energy savings as shown.
B RELATED WORK
In the following, we briefly review work on adversarial
robustness, fault tolerance, backdooring and quantization.
These areas are broadly related to the topic of the main
paper.
Adversarial and Corruption Robustness: Robustness of
DNNs against adversarially perturbed or randomly cor-
rupted inputs received considerable attention in recent years,
see, e.g., relevant surveys (Biggio & Roli, 2018; Xu et al.,
2019). Adversarial examples (Szegedy et al., 2013), i.e.,
nearly imperceptibly perturbed inputs causing misclassifica-
tion, consider an adversarial environment where potential at-
tackers can actively manipulate inputs. This has been shown
to be possible in the white-box setting, with full access to
the DNN, e.g., (Madry et al., 2018; Carlini & Wagner, 2017;
Dong et al., 2017; Chiang et al., 2019; Croce & Hein, 2020),
as well as in the black-box setting, without access to DNN
weights and gradients, e.g., (Chen et al., 2017; Ilyas et al.,
2018; Croce & Hein, 2019; Andriushchenko et al., 2020).
Such attacks are also transferable between models (Liu et al.,
2016) and can be applied in the physical world (Lu et al.,
2017; Kurakin et al., 2016). Obtaining robustness against
adversarial inputs is challenging, recent work focuses on
achieving certified/provable robustness (Peck et al., 2017;
Zhang et al., 2018a; Wong & Kolter, 2018; Gowal et al.,
2018) and variants of adversarial training (Miyato et al.,
2015; Huang et al., 2015; Madry et al., 2018), i.e., train-
ing on adversarial inputs generated on-the-fly. Adversarial
training has been shown to work well empirically, and flaws
such as reduced accuracy (Stutz et al., 2019; Tsipras et al.,
2018) or generalization to attacks not seen during training
has been addressed repeatedly (Carmon et al., 2019; Uesato
et al., 2019; Stutz et al., 2020; Tramèr & Boneh, 2019; Maini
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Table 6: Architectures, Number of Weights W, Expected Number of Bit Errors. Left and Middle: SimpleNet architec-
tures used for MNIST and CIFAR10 with the corresponding output sizes, channels NC , height NH and width NW , and
the total number of weights W . We use group normalization with learnable scale/bias, but reparameterized as outlined in
App. E. Right: The number of expected bit errors for random bit errors, i.e., pmW .
SimpleNet on MNIST
Layer Output Size
NC , NH , NW
Conv+GN+ReLU 32, 28, 28
Conv+GN+ReLU 64, 28, 28
Conv+GN+ReLU 64, 28, 28
Conv+GN+ReLU 64, 28, 28
Pool 64, 14, 14
Conv+GN+ReLU 64, 14, 14
Conv+GN+ReLU 64, 14, 14
Conv+GN+ReLU 128, 14, 14
Pool 128, 7, 7
Conv+GN+ReLU 256, 7, 7
Conv+GN+ReLU 1024, 7, 7
Conv+GN+ReLU 128, 7, 7
Pool 128, 3, 3
Conv+GN+ReLU 128, 3, 3





NC , NH , NW
Conv+GN+ReLU 64, 32, 32
Conv+GN+ReLU 128, 32, 32
Conv+GN+ReLU 128, 32, 32
Conv+GN+ReLU 128, 32, 32
Pool 128, 16, 16
Conv+GN+ReLU 128, 16, 16
Conv+GN+ReLU 128, 16, 16
Conv+GN+ReLU 256, 16, 16
Pool 256, 8, 8
Conv+GN+ReLU 256, 8, 8
Conv+GN+ReLU 256, 8, 8
Pool 256, 4, 4
Conv+GN+ReLU 512, 4, 4
Pool 512, 2, 2
Conv+GN+ReLU 2048, 2, 2
Conv+GN+ReLU 256, 2, 2
Pool 256, 1, 1
Conv+GN+ReLU 256, 1, 1

















et al., 2019). Adversarial inputs have also been considered
for quantized DNNs (Khalil et al., 2019). Corrupted inputs,
in contrast, consider “naturally” occurring corruptions to
which robustness/invariance is desirable for practical ap-
plications. Popular benchmarks such as MNIST-C (Mu &
Gilmer, 2019), Cifar10-C or ImageNet-C (Hendrycks & Di-
etterich, 2019) promote research on corruption robustness
by extending standard datasets with common corruptions,
e.g., blur, noise, saturation changes etc. It is argued that
adversarial robustness, and robustness to random corrup-
tions is related. Approaches are often similar, e.g., based on
adversarial training (Stutz et al., 2020; Lopes et al., 2019;
Kang et al., 2019). In contrast, we consider random bit
errors in the weights, not the inputs.
Fault Tolerance: Fault tolerance, describes structural
changes such as removed units, and has been studied in early
works such as (Neti et al., 1992; Chiu et al., 1994). These
approaches obtain fault tolerant NNs using approaches sim-
ilar to adversarial training (Chiu et al., 1994; Neti et al.,
1992; Deodhare et al., 1998). Recently, weight dropping
regularization (Rahman et al., 2018) or GAN-based training
(Duddu et al., 2019b) has been explored. Additionally, fault
tolerance of adversarially robust models has been consid-
ered in (Duddu et al., 2019a). We refer to (Torres-Huitzil &
Girau, 2017) for a comprehensive survey. In contrast, we do
not consider structural changes/errors in DNNs.
Backdooring: The goal of backdooring is to introduce a
backdoor into a DNN, allowing to control the classification
result by fixed input perturbations at test time. This is usu-
ally achieved through data poisoning (Liu et al., 2018; Liao
et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2018b). However, some works
also consider directly manipulating the weights (Ji et al.,
2018; Dumford & Scheirer, 2018). However, such weight
perturbations are explicitly constructed not to affect accu-
racy on test examples without backdoor. In contrast, we
consider random bit errors (i.e., weight perturbations) that
degrade accuracy significantly.
C LOW-VOLTAGE INDUCED RANDOM BIT
ERRORS IN QUANTIZED DNN WEIGHTS
We provide a more detailed discussion of the considered
error model: random bit errors, induced through low-voltage
operation of SRAM or DRAM commonly used on DNN
accelerators (Kim et al., 2018; Koppula et al., 2019). Work
such as (Chandramoorthy et al., 2019; Koppula et al., 2019)
model the effect of low-voltage induced bit errors using
two parameters: the probability pflt of bit cells in accelerator
memory, being faulty and the probability perr that a faulty bit
cell results in a bit error on access. Following measurements
in works such as (Ganapathy et al., 2019; Kim et al., 2018),
we assume that these errors are not transient errors by setting
perr = 100% such that the overall probability of bit errors is
p := pflt ·perr = pflt. In doing so, we consider the worst-case
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Table 7: Quantization-Aware Training Accuracies.
Clean Err for m = 8 bits or lower using our robust fixed-
point quantization. We obtain competitive performance for
m = 8 and m = 4 bits. On CIFAR100, a Wide ResNet
(WRN) clearly outperforms our standard SimpleNet model.
Batch normalization (BN), improving Err slightly on CI-
FAR10, is significantly less robust than group normalization





















Quant. m, Model Err in %
8, SimpleNet 23.68
8, WRN 18.53
where faulty bit cells always induce bit errors. However,
the noise model from the main paper remains valid for any
arbitrary but fixed perr 6= 100%. For the reminder of this
document, we assume the probability of bit error p = pflt,
with perr = 100%, as in the main paper. In the following,
we describe the two parameters, pflt and perr, in more details.
Faulty Bit Cells. Due to variations in the fabrication pro-
cess, SRAM bit cells become more or less vulnerable to low-
voltage operation. For a specific voltage, the resulting bit
cell failures can be assumed to be random and independent
of each other. We assume a bit to be faulty with probability
pflt increasing exponentially with decreased voltage (Ganap-
athy et al., 2017; 2019; Kim et al., 2018; Chandramoorthy
et al., 2019). Furthermore, the faulty bits for p′flt ≤ pflt can
be assumed to be a subset of those for pflt. For a fixed chip,
consisting of multiple memory arrays, the pattern (spatial
distribution) of faulty cells is fixed for a specific supply
voltage. Across chips/memory arrays, however, faulty cells
are assumed to be random and independent of each other.
Bit Errors in Faulty Bit Cells: Faulty cells may cause bit
errors with probability perr upon read/write access. We note
that bit errors read from memory affect all computations
performed on the read weight value. We assume that a bit
error flips the currently stored bit, where flips 0-to-1 and
1-to-0 are assumed equally likely.
C.1 Profiled Bit Errors
Fig. 8 splits the bit error distributions of Fig. 3 into a 0-to-1
flip and a 1-to-0 bit flip map. The obtained maps, p1t0 and
p0t1, contain per-bit flip probabilities for 1-to-0 and 0-to-1
bit flips. In this particular chip profiled, Fig. 8 (bottom), 0-
to-1 flips are more likely. Similarly, Fig. 8 (right) shows that





























Figure 9: Weight Clipping ImprovesL∞ Robustness. On
CIFAR10, we plot RErr for relative L∞ perturbations on
weights: Random noise withL∞-norm smaller than or equal
to x% of the weight range is applied. CLIPPING clearly
improves robustness. Again, the relative magnitude of noise
is not affected by weight clipping. Note that L∞ noise
usually affects all weights, while random bit errors affect
only a portion of the weights.
most 0-to-1 flips are actually persistent across time i.e., not
random transient errors. The following table summarizing
the key statistics of the profiled chips: the overall bit error
rate p, the rate of 1-to-0 and 0-to-1 flips p1t0 and p0t1, and
the rate of persistent errors psa, all in %:
Chip p p0t1 p1t0 psa
1 2.744 1.27 1.47 1.2230.866 0.38 0.49 0.393
2
4.707 3.443 1.091 0.627
1.01 0.82 0.19 0.105
0.136 0.115 0.021 0.01
3 2.297 1.81 0.48 0.2040.597 0.496 0.0995 0.206
For evaluation, we assume that the DNN weights are
mapped linearly onto the memory of these chips. The bit
error maps are of size 8192× 128 bits for chips 2 and 3 and
2048×128 bits for chip 1. Furthermore, to simulate various
different mappings, we repeat this procedure with various
offsets and compute average RErr across all mappings. For
results, we refer to App. G.5.
C.2 Bounding Generalization to Random Bit Errors
Let w denote the final weights of a trained DNN f . We
test f using n i.i.d. test examples, i.e., (xi, yi)ni=1. We
denote by w′ the weights where each bit of w is flipped
with probability p uniformly at random, corresponding to
the error model from Sec. 3. The expected clean error of f
is given by
E[1f(x;w)6=y] = P(f(x;w) 6= y).
The expected robust error (regarding i.i.d. test examples
drawn from the data distribution) with random bit errors in
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Table 8: Impact of Quantization Scheme on Robustness. Complementary to Tab. 1, we report Err and RErr for various
bit error rates p for the quantization scheme in Eq. (1) with global, per-layer and asymmetric quantization, m = 8 bits.
Instead of quantizing into signed integer, using unsigned integers works better for asymmetric quantization. Furthermore,
proper rounding instead of integer conversion also improves robustness. Note that influence on clean Err is neglegible, i.e.,
the DNN can “learn around” these difference in quantization-aware training. Especially for m = 4 bit, the latter makes a




RErr in %, p in % p=0.01





t Eq. (1), global 4.63 10.70 ±1.37 86.01 ±3.65 90.36 ±0.66 90.71 ±0.49 90.57 ±0.43 –
Eq. (1), per-layer (= NORMAL) 4.36 4.82 ±0.07 5.51 ±0.19 6.37 ±0.32 24.76 ±4.71 72.65 ±6.35 87.40 ±2.47
+asymmetric 4.36 5.76 ±0.09 6.47 ±0.22 7.85 ±0.46 40.78 ±7.56 76.72 ±7.01 85.83 ±2.58
+unsigned 4.42 6.58 ±0.13 6.97 ±0.28 7.49 ±0.41 17.00 ±2.77 54.57 ±8.58 83.18 ±3.94
+rounded (= RQUANT) 4.32 4.60 ±0.08 5.10 ±0.13 5.54 ±0.2 11.28 ±1.47 32.05 ±6 68.65 ±9.23
4
bi
t integer conversion 5.81 90.46 ±0.2 90.40 ±0.21 90.39 ±0.22 90.36 ±0.2 90.36 ±0.22 90.39 ±0.22
proper rounding 5.29 5.49 ±0.04 5.75 ±0.06 5.99 ±0.09 7.71 ±0.36 10.62 ±1.08 15.79 ±2.54
the (quantized) weights is
E[1f(x;w′)6=y] = P(f(x;w′) 6= y).
Here, the weights of the neural network are themselves
random variables. Therefore, with x, y, w, and w′ we de-
note the random variables corresponding to test example,
test label, weights and weights bit random bit errors. With
xj , yj , wi and w′i we denote actual examples. Then, the fol-
lowing proposition derives a simple, probabilistic bound on
the deviation of expected robust error from the empirically
measured one (i.e., RErr in our experiments):
Proposition 1. Let w′i, i = 1, . . . , l be l examples of
weights bit random bit errors (each bit flipped with proba-








1f(xj ;w′i) 6=yj − P(f(x;w









As alternative formulation, with probability 1− δ it holds























































































Ew′ [1f(xj ;w′i)6=yj ]− P(f(x;w
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and we get the upper bound of the proposition.
Remarks: The samples of bit error injected weights
{w′i}li=1 can actually be different for any test example
(xj , yj), even though this is not the case in our evaluation.
Thus, the above bound involves a stronger result: for any
test example, the empirical test error with random bit errors
(i.e., robust test error RErr) and the expected one have to
be similar with the same margin. Note also that this bound
holds for any fixed bit error distribution as the only require-
ment is that the bit error patterns we draw are i.i.d. but
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Table 9: Weight Clipping Improves Robustness. We report Err and RErr for various experiments on the robustness of
weight clipping with wmax, i.e., CLIPPINGwmax . First, we show that the robustness benefit of CLIPPING is independent of
quantization-aware training, robustness also improves when applying post-training quantization. Then, we show results for
both symmetric and asymmetric quantization. For the latter we demonstrate that label smoothing (Szegedy et al., 2016)
reduces the obtained robustness. This supports our hypothesis that weight clipping, driven by minimizing cross-entropy loss
during training, improves robustness through redundancy.
CIFAR10 (m = 8 bit): clipping robustness for post- and during-training quantization
Model Err
in %
RErr in %, p in % p=0.01














c NORMAL 4.37 4.95 ±0.11 5.47 ±0.17 6.03 ±0.22 15.42 ±3.4 51.83 ±9.92 81.74 ±5.14
RQUANT 4.27 4.59 ±0.08 5.10 ±0.13 5.54 ±0.15 10.59 ±1.11 30.58 ±6.05 63.72 ±6.89
CLIPPING0.25 4.96 5.24 ±0.07 5.73 ±0.14 6.16 ±0.21 10.51 ±0.91 26.27 ±5.65 61.49 ±9.03
CLIPPING0.2 5.24 5.48 ±0.05 5.87 ±0.09 6.23 ±0.13 9.47 ±0.7 19.78 ±3.58 43.64 ±8.2
CLIPPING0.15 5.38 5.63 ±0.05 6.03 ±0.09 6.38 ±0.13 8.80 ±0.41 15.74 ±2.24 36.29 ±7.34















) NORMAL 4.36 4.82 ±0.07 5.51 ±0.19 6.37 ±0.32 24.76 ±4.71 72.65 ±6.35 87.40 ±2.47
RQUANT 4.39 4.77 ±0.08 5.43 ±0.21 6.10 ±0.32 17.11 ±3.07 55.35 ±9.4 82.84 ±4.52
CLIPPING0.25 4.63 4.99 ±0.07 5.53 ±0.1 6.06 ±0.16 13.55 ±1.42 41.64 ±7.35 73.39 ±7.15
CLIPPING0.2 4.50 4.79 ±0.06 5.25 ±0.09 5.65 ±0.16 9.64 ±0.99 21.37 ±4.23 45.68 ±7.9
CLIPPING0.15 5.18 5.42 ±0.05 5.76 ±0.08 6.07 ±0.09 8.36 ±0.43 13.80 ±1.45 24.70 ±3.77
CLIPPING0.1 4.86 5.07 ±0.04 5.34 ±0.06 5.59 ±0.1 7.12 ±0.3 9.44 ±0.7 13.14 ±1.79
























NORMAL 4.36 4.82 ±0.07 5.51 ±0.19 6.37 ±0.32 24.76 ±4.71 72.65 ±6.35 87.40 ±2.47
RQUANT 4.32 4.60 ±0.08 5.10 ±0.13 5.54 ±0.2 11.28 ±1.47 32.05 ±6 68.65 ±9.23
CLIPPING0.25 4.58 4.84 ±0.05 5.29 ±0.12 5.71 ±0.16 10.52 ±1.14 27.95 ±4.16 62.46 ±8.89
CLIPPING0.2 4.63 4.91 ±0.05 5.28 ±0.08 5.62 ±0.11 8.27 ±0.35 18.00 ±2.84 53.74 ±8.89
CLIPPING0.15 4.42 4.66 ±0.05 5.01 ±0.09 5.31 ±0.12 7.81 ±0.6 13.08 ±2.21 23.85 ±5.07
CLIPPING0.1 4.82 5.04 ±0.04 5.33 ±0.07 5.58 ±0.1 6.95 ±0.24 8.93 ±0.46 12.22 ±1.29
CLIPPING0.05 5.44 5.59 ±0.04 5.76 ±0.07 5.90 ±0.07 6.53 ±0.13 7.18 ±0.16 7.92 ±0.25
CLIPPING0.2 +LS 4.48 4.77 ±0.05 5.19 ±0.1 5.55 ±0.12 9.46 ±0.82 32.49 ±5.07 68.60 ±7.33
CLIPPING0.15 +LS 4.67 4.86 ±0.05 5.23 ±0.08 5.83 ±0.12 7.99 ±0.43 29.40 ±6.99 68.99 ±8.48
CLIPPING0.1 +LS 4.82 5.05 ±0.04 5.37 ±0.08 6.10 ±0.11 7.36 ±0.4 10.59 ±1.01 18.31 ±2.84
CLIPPING0.05 +LS 5.30 5.43 ±0.03 5.63 ±0.06 6.43 ±0.07 6.51 ±0.15 7.30 ±0.23 8.06 ±0.38
not the bit errors on the pattern. In App. G.6, we consider
results with l = 106, i.e., l n with n = 104 on CIFAR10














in the Proposition is
equal to 4.1%. Thus larger test sets would be required to get
stronger guarantees e.g. for n = 105 one would get 1.7%.
D QUANTIZATION AND BIT
MANIPULATION IN PYTORCH
Our fixed-point quantization Q in Eq. (1) quantizes
weights wi ∈ [−qmax, qmax] ⊂ R into signed integers
{−2m−1− 1, . . . , 2m−1− 1}. Here, the quantization range
[−qmax, qmax] is symmetric around zero. Note that zero is
represented exactly. To implement asymmetric quantiza-
tion, as outlined in Sec. 4.1, the same scheme can be used
to quantize weights wi ∈ [qmin, qmax] within any arbitrary,
potentially asymmetric, interval. To this end, Eq. (1) with
qmax = 1 is used and the weights in [qmin, qmax] are mapped






· 2− 1. (3)
Generally, qmin and qmax are chosen to reflect minimum and
maximum weight value – either from all weights (global
quantization) or per-layer. Furthermore, we argue that asym-
metric quantization becomes more robust when using un-
signed integers as representation. In this case, Eq. (1) can





+ (2m−1 − 1)
Q−1(vi) = ∆(vi − (2m−1 − 1))
(4)
We use asymmetric quantization using N in Eq. (3) with
Eq. (4) as our robust fixed-point quantization.
Following Sec. 4.1, we implement “fake” fixed-point quanti-
zation for quantization-aware training and bit error injection
directly in PyTorch (Paszke et al., 2017). Here, fake quanti-
zation means that computation is performed in floating point,
but before doing a forward pass, the DNN is quantized and
dequantized, i.e., wq = Q−1(Q(w)) in Alg. 1. Note that we
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Table 10: Batch Normalization not Robust. RErr with
group normalization (GN) or batch normalization (BN).
RErr increases when using BN even though clean Err im-
proves slightly compared GN. However, using batch statis-
tics at test time (i.e., “training mode” in PyTorch) improves
RErr significantly indicating that the statistics accumulated
throughout training do not account for random bit errors.
We use group normalization as default.





GN NORMAL 4.32 5.54 11.28CLIPPING0.1 4.82 5.58 6.95
BN w/ Accumulated Statistics
BN NORMAL 3.83 6.36 52.52CLIPPING0.1 4.46 5.32 8.25
BN w/ Batch Statistics at Test Time
BN NORMAL 3.83 6.65 9.63CLIPPING0.1 4.46 6.57 7.29
quantize into unsigned 8 bit integers, irrespective of the tar-
get precision m ≤ 8. To later induce random bit errors, the
8−m most significant bits (MSBs) are masked for m < 8.
Bit manipulation of unsigned 8 bit integers is then imple-
mented in C/CUDA and interfaced to Python using CuPy
(cup) or CFFI (cff). These functions can directly operate on
PyTorch tensors, allowing bit manipulation on the CPU as
well as the GPU. We will make our code publicly available
to faciliate research into DNN robustness against random
bit errors.
E WEIGHT CLIPPING WITH
GROUP/BATCH NORMALIZATION
While weight clipping, i.e., globally constraining weights
to [−wmax, wmax] during training, is easy to implement, we
make a simple adjustment to group and batch normalization
layers: we reparameterize the scale parameter α of batch/-
group normalization, which usually defaults to α = 1 and
may cause problems when clipped, e.g., to [−0.1, 0.1]. In
particular with aggressive weight clipping, α ≤ wmax < 1,
the normalization layers loose their ability to represent the
identity function, considered important for batch normal-
ization in (Ioffe & Szegedy, 2015). Our reparameterization
introduces a learnable, auxiliary parameter α′ such that α
as α = 1 + α′ to solve this problem.
F EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
Datasets: We conduct experiments on MNIST1 (LeCun




Table 11: Weight Clipping with Weight Scaling. For
group normalization (GN) without the reparameterization in
Sec. 4.2, using fixed scale/bias instead, our DNNs are scale-
invariant. Scaling RQUANT down to the weight range of
CLIPPING0.25, however, does not improve robustness. Thus,
the robustness benefit of CLIPPING is not due to reduced
quantization range or smaller absolute errors.
CIFAR10 (m = 8 bit): scaling w/o reparameterized GN
Model Err
in %
RErr in %, p in %
(see text) p=0.1 p=1
RQUANT 4.67 6.12 ±0.2 35.25 ±6.41
CLIPPING0.25 4.96 6.13 ±0.16 16.09 ±1.85
RQUANT→ CLIPPING0.25 4.64 6.10 ±0.18 35.28 ±5.82
sists of 60k training and 10k test images from 10 classes.
These are gray-scale and of size 28× 28 pixels. CIFAR con-
sists of 50k training and 10k test images of size 32× 32× 3
(i.e., color images). CIFAR10 has images corresponding to
10 classes, CIFAR100 containts imaves from 100 classes.
Architecture: The used SimpleNet architectures (Hasan-
Pour et al., 2016) are summarized in Tab. 6, including the
total number of weights W . On CIFAR, this results in a
total of roughly W ≈ 5.5M weights. Due to the lower
resolution on MNIST, channel width in each convolutional
layer is halved, and one stage of convolutional layers in-
cluding a pooling layer is skipped. This results in a total of
roughly W ≈ 1M weights. In both cases, we replaced batch
normalization (BN) (Ioffe & Szegedy, 2015) with group
normalization (GN) (Wu & He, 2018). The GN layers are
reparameterized as in App. E to facilitate weight clipping.
Tab. 6 also includes the expected number of bit errors given
various rates p for random bit errors. Regarding the number
of weights W , SimpleNet compares favorably to, e.g., VGG
(Simonyan & Zisserman, 2015): VGG-16 has 14M weights
on CIFAR. Additionally, we found SimpleNet to be easier to
train without BN, which is desirable as BN reduces robust-
ness to bit errors significantly, cf. App. G.1. The ResNet-50
(He et al., 2016) used for experiments in App. G.7 follows
the official PyTorch (Paszke et al., 2017) implementation.
The Wide ResNet (WRN) (Zagoruyko & Komodakis, 2016)
used on CIFAR100 is adapted from3, but we use 12 base
channels, instead of 16, reducing W from roughly 36.5Mio
to 20.5Mio.
Training: As outlined in Sec. 5, we use stochastic gradient
descent to minimize cross-entropy loss. We use an initial
learning rate of 0.05, multiplied by 0.1 after 2/5, 3/5 and
4/5 of 100/250 epochs on MNIST/CIFAR. Our batch size
is 128 and momentum of 0.9 is used together with weight
decay of 5 · 10−4. On CIFAR, we whiten the input images
3https://github.com/meliketoy/wide-resnet.
pytorch
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RQUANT RANDBET (w/o weight clipping)
CLIPPING0.1 CLIPPING0.05
RQUANT CLIPPING0.25 ↑



















Figure 10: Weight Clipping Increases Redundancy. We show weight distributions of selected layers (top) for RQUANT,
RANDBET (without weight clipping) as well as CLIPPING0.1 and CLIPPING0.05. We show weights and biases for the logit
layer as well as the first and last (13th) convolutional layer. Scale/Bias parameters of GN are also included. Below (left),
this is shown for the scaling experiment from Tab. 11 (GN parameters are fixed). Note that RANDBET only affects the
logit layer, while CLIPPING increases the used (relative) weight range significantly. On the bottom (right), we plot various
measures of redundancy, see the text for discussion and details. The relative absolute error is computed considering random
bit errors with probability p = 1%.
and use AutoAugment4 (Cubuk et al., 2018) with Cutout
(Devries & Taylor, 2017). Cutout is applied with a win-
dow size of 16 × 16, and independent of AutoAugment,
we apply random cropping with up to 4 pixels. Created
black spaces are filled using the mean image color (grayish).
Initialization follows (He et al., 2015). The full training set
is used for training, and we do not rely on early stopping.
For RANDBET, we use λ = 1 and start injecting bit errors
when the loss is below 1.75 on MNIST/CIFAR10 or 3.5 on
CIFAR100. Tab. 7 highlights clean test error (Err) obtained
for various precision m and compared to other architectures,
e.g., ResNet-50, on CIFAR10, which performs worse when
using GN.
Random Bit Errors: We simulate 50 different chips with
4https://github.com/DeepVoltaire/
AutoAugment
enough memory arrays to accomodate all weights by draw-
ing uniform samples u(c) ∼ U(0, 1)W×m for each chip c
and all m bits for a total of W weights. Then, for chip c, bit
j in weight wi is flipped iff u
(c)
ij ≤ p. This assumes a linear
memory layout of all W weights. The pattern, i.e., spatial
distribution, of bit errors for chip c is fixed by u(c), while
across all 50 chips, bit errors are uniformly distributed. We
emphasize that we pre-determine u(c), c = 1, . . . , 50, once
for all our experiments using fixed random seeds. Thus, our
robustness results are entirely comparable across all models
as well as bit error rates p. Also note that, as explained in
Sec. 3, the bit errors for a fixed chip c at probability p′ < p
are a subset of those for bit error rate p. The expected
number of bit errors for various rates p is summarized in
Tab. 6.
Implementation Details are covered in Sec. D.
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Table 12: RANDBET Robustness with Symmetric Quantization. Average RErr and standard deviation for CLIPPING
and RANDBET with wmax = 0.1 and symmetric quantization, i.e., larger quantization range than asymmetric quantization.
Also cf. Tab. 9 and Tab. 18. Robustness decreases slightly compared to asymmetric quantization, however, CLIPPING and
RANDBET are still effective in reducing RErr against high bit error rates p.
CIFAR10 (m = 8 bit): RANDBET with symmetric quantization
Model Err
in %
RErr in %, p in % p=0.01
0.01 0.05 0.1 0.5 1 1.5
NORMAL 4.36 4.82 ±0.07 5.51 ±0.19 6.37 ±0.32 24.76 ±4.71 72.65 ±6.35 87.40 ±2.47
RQUANT 4.39 4.77 ±0.08 5.43 ±0.21 6.10 ±0.32 17.11 ±3.07 55.35 ±9.4 82.84 ±4.52
CLIPPING0.1 4.86 5.07 ±0.04 5.34 ±0.06 5.59 ±0.1 7.12 ±0.3 9.44 ±0.7 13.14 ±1.79
RANDBET0.1 p=0.01 5.07 5.27 ±0.04 5.54 ±0.07 5.73 ±0.11 7.18 ±0.29 9.63 ±0.9 13.81 ±2.2
RANDBET0.1 p=0.1 4.62 4.83 ±0.04 5.09 ±0.08 5.31 ±0.08 6.70 ±0.28 8.89 ±0.59 12.20 ±1.33
RANDBET0.1 p=1 5.03 5.22 ±0.04 5.43 ±0.06 5.61 ±0.07 6.56 ±0.13 7.70 ±0.26 8.99 ±0.42
RANDBET0.1 p=1.5 5.24 5.37 ±0.03 5.57 ±0.06 5.76 ±0.07 6.66 ±0.14 7.62 ±0.25 8.71 ±0.42
RANDBET0.1 p=2 5.82 5.97 ±0.04 6.19 ±0.07 6.37 ±0.09 7.22 ±0.19 8.03 ±0.23 8.96 ±0.38
G EXPERIMENTS
G.1 Batch Normalization
We deliberately replace batch normalization (BN) (Ioffe &
Szegedy, 2015) by group normalization (GN) (Wu & He,
2018) in our experiments. Tab. 10 demonstrates that RErr
increases significantly when using BN compared to GN in-
dicating that BN is more vulnerable to bit errors in DNN
weights. For example, without clipping, RErr increases from
11.28% to staggering 52.52% when replacing GN with BN.
Note that, following App. E, the BN/GN parameters (i.e.,
scale/bias) are reparameterized to account for weight clip-
ping. The observations in Tab. 10 can also be confirmed
without quantization, e.g., considering random L∞ noise
in the weights. We suspect that the running statistics accu-
mulated during training do not account for the random bit
errors at test time, even for RANDBET. This is confirmed
in Tab. 10 (bottom) showing that RErr reduces significanlty
when using the batch statistics at test time. Generally, ro-
bustness improves accuracy, but might not be beneficial in
terms of robustness, as also discussed for adversariale ex-
amples (Galloway et al., 2019). Using GN also motivates
our use of SimpleNet instead of, e.g., ResNet-50, which
generally performs worse with GN, cf. Tab. 7.
G.2 Robust Quantization
Tab. 8 shows results complementary to the main paper, con-
sidering additional bit error rates p. Note that, form = 8 bit,
changes in the quantization has neglegible impact on clean
Err. Only the change from gloabl to per-layer quantization
makes a difference. However, considering RErr for larger
bit error rates, reducing the quantization range, e.g., through
per-layer and asymmetric quantization, improves robustness
significantly. Oher aspects of the quantization scheme also
play an important role, especially for low-precision such as
m = 4 bit, cf. Tab. 8, as outlined in the following.
For example, using asymmetric quantization into signed
integers actually increases RErr for larger p compared to
“just” using symmetric per-layer quantization (rows 2 and 3).
Using unsigned integers instead reduces RErr significantly.
We belive this to be due to the two’s complement represen-
tation of signed integers being used with an asymmetric
quantization range. In symmetric quantization (around 0,
i.e., [−qmax, qmax]), bit errors in the sign bit incur not only
a change of the integer’s sign, but also the corresponding
change in the weights sign5. Assuming an asymmetric quan-
tization of [qmin, qmax] with 0 < qmin < qmax, bit errors in
sign bits are less meaningful. For example, flipping any bit
0-to-1 usually increases the value of the integer. However,
a 0-to-1 flip in the sign bit actually decreases the value and
produces a negative integer. However, this change from
positive to negative is not reflected in the corresponding
weight value (as qmin > 0). For high bit error rates p%, this
happens more and more frequently and these changes seem
to have larger impact on DNN performance, i.e., RErr.
Additionally, we considered the difference between using
integer conversion for wi/∆ and using proper rounding, i.e.,
dwi/∆c. We emphasize that, for m = 8 bit, there is no
significant difference in terms of clean Err. However, using
proper rounding reduces the approximation error slightly.
For m = 8 bit, using p = 2.5% bit error rate, the average
absolute error (in the weights) across 10 random bit error
patterns reduces by 2%. Nevertheless, it has significantly
larger impact on RErr. For m = 4, this is more pronounced:
rounding reduces the average absolute error by roughly
67%. Surprisingly, this is not at all reflected in the clean Err,
which only decreases from 5.81% to 5.29%. It seems that
the DNN learns to compensate these errors during training.
At test time, however, RErr reflects this difference in terms
5An unsigned integer of value 127 is represented as 01111111.
Flipping the most (left-most) significant bit results in 11111111
corresponding to 255, i.e., the value increases. For a signed integer
in two’s complement representation, the same bit flip changes
the value from 127 to −1, while 0-to-1 not affecting the sign bit
generally increase value (also for negative integers).
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Table 13: RANDBET Variants. Err and RErr for RAND-
BET and two variants: curricular RANDBET, with p being
increased slowly from p/20 to p during the first half of train-
ing; and “alternating” RANDBET where weight updates
increasing quantization range, i.e., increasing the maximum
absolute weight per layer, are not possible based on gradi-
ents from perturbed weights, see Sec. G.4 for details. Both
variants decrease robustness slightly. This is in contrast
to, e.g., (Koppula et al., 2019), using curricular training on
profiled bit errors with success.





RANDBET p=0.1, wmax = 0.1 4.93 5.67 8.65
RANDBET p=1, wmax = 0.1 5.06 5.87 7.60
Curr. RANDBET p=1, wmax = 0.1 4.89 5.78 8.51
Curr. RANDBET p=1, wmax = 0.1 5.32 6.13 7.98
Alt. RANDBET p=1, wmax = 0.1 5.07 5.91 8.93
Alt. RANDBET p=1, wmax = 0.1 5.24 6.25 8.02
of robustness.
G.3 Weight Clipping
In Tab. 9 we present robustness results, i.e., RErr, for
weight clipping. Note that weight clipping constraints the
weights during training to [−wmax, wmax] through projec-
tion. We demonstrate that weight clipping can also be used
independent of quantization. To this end, we train DNNs
with weight clipping, but without quantization. We ap-
ply post-training quantization and evaluate bit error robust-
ness. While the robustness is reduced slightly compared to
quantization-aware training and weight clipping, the robust-
ness benefits of weight clipping are clearly visible. For ex-
ample, clipping at wmax = 0.1 improves RErr from 30.58%
to 9.8% against p = 1% bit error rate when performing
post-training quantization. With symmetric quantization-
aware training, CLIPPING0.1 improves slightly to 7.31%.
Below (middle), we show results for weight clipping and
symmetric quantization. These results are complemented
in Tab. 12 with RANDBET. Symmetric quantization might
be preferable due to reduced computation and energy cost
compared to asymmetric quantization. However, this also
increases RErr slightly. Nevertheless, CLIPPING consis-
tently improves robustness, independent of the difference
in quantization. Finally, on the bottom, we show comple-
mentary results to Tab. 2, confirming the adverse effect of
label smoothing (Szegedy et al., 2016) on RErr, cf. Sec. 5.2.
Fig. 9 also shows that the obtained robustness generalizes
to other error models such as L∞ weight perturbations, see
caption for details.
We hypothesize that weight clipping improves robustness as
it encourages redundancy in weights and activations during
training. This is because cross-entropy loss encourages large
Table 14: RANDBET with ResNets. We report RErr for
RQUANT, CLIPPING and RANDBET using ResNet-20 and
ResNet-50. According to Tab. 7, Err increases significantly
when using group normalization for ResNet-50, explain-
ing the generally higher RErr. However, using ResNets,
CLIPPING and RANDBET continue to improve robustness
significantly, despite a ResNet-50 having roughly 23.5Mio
weights.






RQUANT 4.34 13.89 ±2.45 81.25 ±5.08
CLIPPING0.1 4.83 6.76 ±0.16 11.23 ±0.97
RANDBET0.1, p=1 5.28 6.72 ±0.19 8.96 ±0.49
ResNet-50
RQUANT 6.81 32.94 ±5.51 90.98 ±0.67
CLIPPING0.1 5.99 9.27 ±0.44 36.39 ±7.03
RANDBET0.1, p=1 6.04 7.87 ±0.22 11.27 ±0.6
logits and weight clipping forces the DNN to “utilize” many
different weights to produce large logits. Tab. 11 presents a
simple experiment in support of our hypothesis. We already
emphasized that, relatively, weight clipping does not reduce
the impact of bit errors. Nevertheless, when using group nor-
malization(GN) without our reparameterization, the trained
DNNs are scale-invariant in their weights. Thus, we down-
scale NORMAL to have the same maximum absolute weight
value as CLIPPING0.25 (NORMAL→ CLIPPING0.25). This
scaling is applied globally, not per layer. Tab. 11 shows that
“just” down-scaling does not induce robustness, as expected.
Thus, the benefit of CLIPPING in terms of robustness does
not come from the reduced quantization range.
Fig. 10 presents further supporting evidence for our hypothe-
sis: While RANDBET mainly affects the logits layer, CLIP-
PING clearly increases the weight range used by the DNN.
Here, the weight range is understood relative to wmax (or the
maxmimum absolute weight value for NORMAL). This is
pronounced in particular when up-scaling the clipped model
(bottom left). Finally, Fig. 10 (bootom right) also considers
three attempts to measure redundancy in weights and activa-
tions. The relative absolute error is computed with respect to
p = 1% bit error rate and decreases for CLIPPING , meaning
that random bit errors have less impact. Weight relevance is
computed as the sum of absolute weights, i.e.,
∑
i |wi|, nor-
malized by the maximum absolute weight:
∑
i |wi|/maxi |wi|.
This metric measures how many weights are, considering
their absolute value, relevant. Finally, We also measure
activation redundancy using ReLU relevance, computing
the fraction of non-zero activations after the final ReLU ac-
tivation. CLIPPING increases redundancy in the final layer
significantly. Finally, Fig. 10 (bottom left) shows the dif-
ference in weight distributions by upscaling CLIPPING0.25
to the same weight range as NORMAL. Clearly, CLIPPING
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Table 15: Generalization to Profiled Bit Errors. Comple-
mentary to Tab. 5, we show RErr on profiled bit errors, chips
1-3, for RANDBET as well as CLIPPING . Note that for chip
3, CLIPPING0.05 performs slightly better than RANDBET.






RQUANT 4.32 23.57 89.84
CLIPPING0.05 5.44 7.17 10.50
RANDBET0.05 p=1.5 5.62 7.04 9.37
p≈0.14 p≈1
2
RQUANT 4.32 6.00 74.00
CLIPPING0.05 5.44 5.98 10.02
RANDBET0.05 p=1.5 5.62 6.00 9.00
p≈0.03 p≈0.5
3 RQUANT 4.32 5.47 80.49CLIPPING0.05 5.44 5.78 11.88
RANDBET0.05 p=1.5 5.62 5.85 12.44
causes more non-zero weights be learned by the DNN. This
can be observed across all types of parameters, i.e., weights
or biases as well as convolutional or fully connected layers.
G.4 Random Bit Error Training (RANDBET)
Tab. 12 shows complementary results for RANDBET using
symmetric quantization. Symmetric quantization generally
tends to reduce robustness, i.e., increase RErr, across all bit
error rates p, cf. Tab. 4 in the main paper. Thus, the positive
impact of RANDBET is pronounced, i.e., RANDBET be-
comes more important to obtain high robustness when less
robust fixed-point quantization is used. These experiments
also demonstrate the utility of RANDBET independent of
the quantization scheme at hand.
We consider two variants of RANDBET motivated by re-
lated work (Koppula et al., 2019). Specifically, in (Koppula
et al., 2019), the bit error rate seen during training is in-
creased slowly during training. Note that (Koppula et al.,
2019) trains on fixed bit error patterns. Thus, increasing the
bit error rate during training is essential to avoid the effect
shown in Tab. 3: the DNN is supposed to be robustness to
any bit error rate p′ < p smaller than the target bit error
rate. While this is generally the case using our RANDBET,
Tab. 13 shows that slowly increasing the random bit error
rate during training, called “curricular” RANDBET, has
no significant benefit over standard RANDBET. In fact,
RErr increases slightly. Similarly, we found that RAND-
BET tends to increase the range of weights: the weights are
“spread out”, cf. Fig. 10 (top right). This also increases the
quantization range, which has negative impact on robust-
ness as discussed in Sec. 5.1. Thus, we experimented with
RANDBET using two weight updates per iteration: one
using clean weights, one on weights with bit errors. This is
in contrast to averaging both updates as in Alg. 1. Updates
computed from perturbed weights are limited to the current
Table 16: Fixed Pattern Bit Error Training. Complemen-
tary results for Tab. 3, reporting RErr for training on fixed
(e.g., profiled) bit error patterns (PATTBET). We show addi-
tional results for chip 2 from Tab. 5. Note that for PATTBET
on chip 1/2 we used only the stuck-at-errors shown in Fig. 8,
which is why the bit error rates deviate from Tab. 5.
Model (CIFAR10) RErr in %, p in %
Profiled Bit Errors (Chip 1) p≈0.1 p≈0.6
PATTBET, p≈1.22 9.52 7.20
PATTBET, p≈0.39 5.77 67.87
PATTBET0.15, p≈1.22 7.67 6.52
PATTBET0.15, p≈0.39 5.94 30.96
Profiled Bit Errors (Chip 2) p≈0.1 p≈0.63
PATTBET p≈0.63 85.84 10.76
PATTBET, p≈0.1 90.56 5.93
PATTBET0.15 p≈0.63 12.02 8.70
PATTBET0.15 p≈0.1 90.68 6.51
Table 17: Results for Probabilistic Guarantees.. Average
RErr and standard deviation for l = 1Mio random bit error
patterns. In comparison with the results for l = 50 from
the main paper, there are no significant changes in RErr.
However, standard deviation increases slightly, from 0.11 to
0.15 against RANDBET.
CIFAR10: Stress Test for Guarantees
Model Err
in %
RErr in %, p = 1%
(CIFAR10) l = 50 l = 1Mio
RQUANT 4.32 32.05 ±6 31.97 ±6.35
CLIPPING0.05 5.44 7.18 ±0.16 7.19 ±0.2
RANDBET0.05 p=2 5.42 6.71 ±0.11 6.73 ±0.15
quantization ranges, i.e., the maximum absolute error cannot
change. This is ensured through projection. This makes sure
that RANDBET does not increase the quantization range
during training as changes in the quantization range are lim-
ited to updates from clean weights. Again, Tab. 13 shows
this variant to perform slightly worse.
G.5 Profiled Bit Errors
Following the evaluation on profiled bit errors outlined in
App. C.1, Tab. 15 shows complementary results for CLIP-
PING0.05 and RANDBET0.05 trained with p = 1.5% on
all profiled chips. Note that for particularly extreme cases,
such as chip 3, CLIPPING might perform slightly better
than RANDBET. Overall, however, RANDBET generalizes
reasonably well, with very good results on chip 1 which
is closest to our bit error model. Results on chip 2 and 3,
due to bit errors being strongly aligned along columns (cf.
Fig. 8), are slightly worse. However, RANDBET does not
fail catastrophically. Instead, RErr degrades slowly.
In Tab. 16, we follow the procedure of App. C.1 considering
only stuck-at-0 and stuck-at-1 bit errors (i.e., where p1t0 and
p0t1 are 1). This is illustrated in Fig. 8 (right). Thus, the bit
error rates deviate slightly from those reported in Tab. 15,
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CIFAR-100, m = 8 bits
wmax = 0.2
wmax = 0.1
wmax = 0.1, p=0.1
wmax = 0.05, p=1























CIFAR-100, m = 6 bits
wmax = 0.1
wmax = 0.05
wmax = 0.1, p=0.1
wmax = 0.05, p=1























CIFAR-100, m = 4 bits
wmax = 0.1
wmax = 0.05
wmax = 0.1, p=0.1
wmax = 0.05, p=1















































































Legend: Normal RQuant +Clipping +RandBET
(See plots for hyper-parameters, i.e., wmax and p during training for Clipping and RandBET.)
Figure 11: Summary Results on CIFAR10, CIFAR100 and MNIST. Complementary to Fig. 7, we highlight individual
CLIPPING and RANDBET models. Note that Fig. 7, in contrast, presents the best, i.e., lowest RErr, model for each bit
error rate p individually. Instead, individual models help to illustrate the involved trade-offs: CLIPPING with small wmax or
RANDBET with high bit error rate p increases the clean Err, thereby also increasing RErr for very small bit error rates.
However, RErr against large bit error rates can be reduced significantly.
see the table in App. C.1 for details. Furthermore, We
consider only one weight-to-SRAM mapping, i.e., without
offset. PATTBET is trained and evaluated on the exact same
bit error pattern, but potentially with different bit error rates
p. Note that the bit errors for p′ < p are a subset of those for
bit error rate p. Thus, it is surprising that, on both chips 1 and
2, PATTBET trained on higher bit error rates does not even
generalize to lower bit error rates (i.e., higher voltage). This
is problematic in practice as the DNN accelerator should
not perform worse when increasing voltage.
G.6 Guarantees from Prop. 1
Based on the bound derived in Sec. C.2, we conduct ex-
periments with l = 1Mio random bit error patterns, such
that l  n where n = 10k is the number of test examples
on CIFAR10. Considering Prop. 1, this would guarantee
a deviation in RErr of at most 4.1% with probability at
least 99%. As shown in Tab. 17, the obtained RErr with
1Mio random bit error patterns deviates insignificantly from
the results in the main paper. Only standard deviation of
RErr increases slightly. These results emphasize that the
results for CLIPPING and RANDBET from the main paper
generalize well.
G.7 Other Architectures
Tab. 14 shows results on CIFAR10 using ResNet-20 and
ResNet-50. We note that, in both cases, we use group nor-
malization (GN) instead of batch normalization (BN) as
outlined in Sec. G.1. ResNet-50, in particular, suffers from
using GN due to the significant depth: the clean Err reduces
from 3.67% to 6.81% in Tab. 7. Nevertheless, CLIPPING
and RANDBET remain effective against random bit errors,
even for higher bit error rates of p = 1.5%. This is triking as
ResNet-50 consists of roughly 23.5Mio weights, compared
to 5.5Mio of the used SimpleNet in the main paper.
G.8 Summary Results
Fig. 11 summarizes our results: In contrast to Fig. 7, we con-
sider individual CLIPPING and RANDBET models instead
of focusing on the best results per bit error rate p. Addi-
tionally, we show our complete results for lower precisions,
i.e., m = 4, 3, 2 on CIFAR10 and MNIST. Note that these
Bit Error Robustness for Energy-Efficient DNN Accelerators
results, in tabular form, are included in Tab. 18 to 21. Mod-
erate CLIPPING, e.g., using wmax = 0.15 on CIFAR10 (in
red), has negligible impact on clean Err (i.e., p = 0 on the
x-axis) while improving robustness beyond p = 0.1% bit
error rate. Generally, however, higher robustness is obtained
at the cost of increased clean Err, e.g., for wmax = 0.05
(in blue). Here, it is important to note that in low-voltage
operation, only RErr matters – clean Err is only relevant
for voltages higher than Vmin. RANDBET further improves
robustness for high bit error rates, while continuing to in-
crease clean Err slightly. For example, RANDBET with
wmax = 0.05 and trained with p = 2% bit errors increases
clean Err to 5.42% but is also able to keep RErr below 7%
up to p = 1% bit error rate (in orange). Reducing precision
generally increases Err and RErr, especially for m = 2 bit.
Here, our simple fixed-point quantization scheme is clearly
limited compared to state-of-the-art. Nevertheless, even for
m = 2 bits, RANDBET (violet or orange) is able to keep
RErr low until roughly p = 0.1% bit error rate. Note that
for m = 2, more aggressive clipping generally helps during
training and, thus, also reduces clean Err (cf. wmax = 0.1
and wmax = 0.05 in red and blue).
Similar trade-offs can be observed on CIFAR100 and
MNIST. On CIFAR100, we see that task difficulty also
reduces the bit error rate that is tolerable without signifi-
cant increase it RErr. Here, p = 0.1% increases RErr by
more than 3%, even with RANDBET (and weight clipping).
Furthermore, CIFAR100 demonstrates that CLIPPING and
RANDBET are applicable to significantly larger architec-
tures such as Wide ResNets with. On MNIST, in contrast,
bit error rates of up to p = 20% are easily possible. At
such bit error rates, the benefit of RANDBET is extremely
significant as even CLIPPING0.025 exhibits very high RErr
of 32.68% at p = 20%, cf. Tab. 21.
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Table 18: Overall Robustness Results on CIFAR10. Tabular results corresponding to Fig. 7 and 11 for m = 8 and m = 4
bits. We show RErr for NORMAL, CLIPPING and RANDBET with various wmax and p across a subset of test bit error rates.
CIFAR10: summary results for m = 8 and m = 4 bit
Model Err
in %
RErr in %, p in % p=0.01






NORMAL 4.36 4.82 5.51 6.37 24.76 72.65 87.40 89.76 90.15
RQUANT 4.32 4.60 5.10 5.54 11.28 32.05 68.65 85.28 89.01
CLIPPING0.25 4.58 4.84 5.29 5.71 10.52 27.95 62.46 82.61 88.08
CLIPPING0.2 4.63 4.91 5.28 5.62 8.27 18.00 53.74 82.02 88.27
CLIPPING0.15 4.42 4.66 5.01 5.31 7.81 13.08 23.85 42.12 61.20
CLIPPING0.1 4.82 5.04 5.33 5.58 6.95 8.93 12.22 17.80 27.02
CLIPPING0.05 5.44 5.59 5.76 5.90 6.53 7.18 7.92 8.70 9.56
CLIPPING0.025 7.10 7.20 7.32 7.40 7.82 8.18 8.43 8.74 –
RANDBET1 p=0.01 4.56 4.93 5.50 6.06 14.14 66.07 86.86 89.80 90.35
RANDBET1 p=0.1 4.50 4.80 5.27 5.72 10.33 41.10 75.90 86.52 89.03
RANDBET1 p=1 7.38 7.69 8.17 8.58 11.10 14.90 21.08 41.11 71.09
RANDBET0.2 p=0.01 4.44 4.67 5.09 5.48 8.64 17.97 41.53 68.95 82.48
RANDBET0.2 p=0.1 4.51 4.73 5.07 5.39 7.99 19.21 54.94 80.12 86.55
RANDBET0.2 p=1 5.46 5.68 5.97 6.20 7.63 9.47 12.38 21.47 50.86
RANDBET0.15 p=0.01 4.64 4.87 5.17 5.45 7.54 15.83 54.07 81.41 86.75
RANDBET0.15 p=0.1 4.86 5.07 5.36 5.64 7.74 12.33 22.38 40.09 60.78
RANDBET0.15 p=1 5.27 5.44 5.68 5.88 7.11 8.63 11.13 27.74 64.97
RANDBET0.1 p=0.01 4.99 5.15 5.39 5.62 6.93 9.01 12.83 22.81 41.04
RANDBET0.1 p=0.1 4.72 4.92 5.15 5.37 6.74 8.53 11.40 15.97 23.59
RANDBET0.1 p=1 4.90 5.05 5.26 5.43 6.36 7.41 8.65 12.25 27.21
RANDBET0.1 p=1.5 5.53 5.67 5.87 6.03 6.84 7.76 8.80 10.03 11.68
RANDBET0.1 p=2 5.71 5.87 6.07 6.22 7.00 7.83 8.69 9.70 10.91
RANDBET0.05 p=0.1 5.32 5.41 5.59 5.72 6.34 6.96 7.62 8.28 9.13
RANDBET0.05 p=1 5.24 5.36 5.50 5.60 6.18 6.73 7.26 7.88 8.49
RANDBET0.05 p=1.5 5.62 5.71 5.84 5.95 6.50 7.02 7.52 7.97 8.51
RANDBET0.05 p=2 5.42 5.55 5.68 5.78 6.26 6.71 7.13 7.58 8.02
RANDBET0.025 p=1 6.78 6.88 7.00 7.08 7.46 7.75 8.02 8.24 8.47
RANDBET0.025 p=1.5 6.89 6.99 7.11 7.19 7.58 7.94 8.26 8.52 8.77
RANDBET0.025 p=2 6.93 7.02 7.12 7.20 7.57 7.87 8.11 8.33 8.58






RQUANT 4.83 5.29 5.98 6.59 15.72 50.45 79.86 87.17 89.47
CLIPPING0.25 4.78 5.16 5.75 6.26 12.08 30.62 60.52 80.07 87.01
CLIPPING0.2 4.90 5.20 5.65 6.04 9.67 27.24 63.96 82.63 87.21
CLIPPING0.15 4.78 5.07 5.43 5.79 8.40 14.61 28.53 50.83 70.32
CLIPPING0.1 5.29 5.49 5.75 5.99 7.71 10.62 15.79 24.97 37.94
CLIPPING0.05 5.78 5.92 6.08 6.21 6.98 7.86 8.77 9.76 11.04
RANDBET0.2 p=0.01 5.14 5.42 5.85 6.23 10.44 23.84 49.25 73.35 83.16
RANDBET0.2 p=0.1 4.77 5.01 5.41 5.76 8.66 16.06 32.40 56.69 75.21
RANDBET0.2 p=1 6.27 6.52 6.86 7.12 8.78 11.33 15.17 21.43 32.19
RANDBET0.15 p=0.01 4.88 5.13 5.54 5.92 8.51 14.21 26.26 46.02 66.13
RANDBET0.15 p=0.1 4.50 4.72 5.05 5.36 7.58 14.12 43.00 76.28 85.54
RANDBET0.15 p=1 5.99 6.18 6.45 6.65 8.00 9.74 12.50 16.73 24.09
RANDBET0.1 p=0.01 5.07 5.29 5.58 5.83 7.54 10.46 15.34 24.63 39.76
RANDBET0.1 p=0.1 4.82 5.04 5.32 5.53 6.82 8.85 12.48 21.36 40.03
RANDBET0.1 p=1 5.39 5.55 5.77 5.96 7.04 8.34 9.77 11.85 14.91
RANDBET0.05 p=0.1 5.14 5.26 5.46 5.61 6.38 7.19 8.06 9.16 10.46
RANDBET0.05 p=1 5.60 5.71 5.85 5.97 6.54 7.10 7.68 8.28 8.99
RANDBET0.05 p=1.5 5.51 5.64 5.77 5.87 6.38 6.98 7.51 8.10 8.72
RANDBET0.05 p=2 5.49 5.62 5.77 5.90 6.43 6.99 7.53 8.06 8.62
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Table 19: Overall Robustness Results on CIFAR10. Overall Robustness Results on CIFAR10. Continued from Tab. 18;
tabular results corresponding to Fig. 7 and 11 for m = 3 and m = 2 bits. We show RErr for NORMAL, CLIPPING and
RANDBET with various wmax and p across a subset of test bit error rates.
CIFAR10: summary results for m = 3 and m = 2 bit
Model Err
in %
RErr in %, p in % p=0.01






RQUANT 79.59 83.95 88.57 91.07 96.15 97.81 98.20 98.60 99.07
CLIPPING0.25 6.89 7.34 8.00 8.65 14.46 28.70 53.64 75.51 85.13
CLIPPING0.2 5.82 6.21 6.79 7.30 11.90 23.31 43.00 65.68 78.79
CLIPPING0.15 5.84 6.16 6.60 6.95 9.95 15.92 27.84 47.54 67.08
CLIPPING0.1 5.71 6.01 6.39 6.73 8.99 13.06 20.88 35.13 51.76
CLIPPING0.05 5.61 5.78 6.01 6.19 7.07 8.13 9.34 10.95 13.16
RANDBET0.2 p=0.01 5.72 6.14 6.77 7.30 12.84 26.46 50.52 72.46 83.09
RANDBET0.2 p=0.1 6.23 6.55 7.04 7.53 11.38 21.36 41.93 65.54 79.94
RANDBET0.2 p=1 7.61 7.84 8.20 8.52 10.30 12.82 16.65 21.81 29.64
RANDBET0.15 p=0.01 5.61 5.94 6.40 6.77 9.59 15.72 28.06 46.88 64.39
RANDBET0.15 p=0.1 5.33 5.56 5.99 6.33 9.01 14.06 23.44 40.36 59.92
RANDBET0.15 p=1 7.26 7.52 7.82 8.07 9.58 11.47 13.87 17.58 23.01
RANDBET0.1 p=0.01 5.13 5.41 5.72 6.00 8.06 11.25 17.22 26.96 42.72
RANDBET0.1 p=0.1 5.69 5.96 6.26 6.51 8.04 10.81 15.51 23.88 37.52
RANDBET0.1 p=1 5.76 5.95 6.22 6.44 7.59 8.97 10.76 13.21 16.95
RANDBET0.05 p=0.01 5.50 5.62 5.83 5.99 6.83 7.79 9.05 10.48 12.32
RANDBET0.05 p=0.1 5.44 5.58 5.76 5.90 6.72 7.60 8.60 9.92 11.70






RQUANT 88.68 89.53 91.62 93.23 97.74 98.40 97.85 99.20 98.74
CLIPPING0.25 90.14 90.54 91.13 91.82 95.96 96.90 97.21 96.66 97.12
CLIPPING0.2 82.00 84.86 90.79 94.17 97.25 96.69 97.16 97.73 97.01
CLIPPING0.15 14.62 15.29 16.30 17.16 22.88 33.18 50.86 71.17 84.30
CLIPPING0.1 7.87 8.29 8.93 9.57 13.95 23.65 42.43 64.65 80.89
CLIPPING0.05 6.59 6.78 7.05 7.26 8.55 10.26 12.73 15.99 20.51
CLIPPING0.025 6.94 7.06 7.23 7.34 7.96 8.57 9.16 9.77 10.47
RANDBET0.05 p=0.01 6.00 6.21 6.47 6.66 7.88 9.51 11.53 14.99 19.60
RANDBET0.05 p=0.1 5.83 6.04 6.30 6.52 7.73 9.32 11.41 14.49 19.77
RANDBET0.025 p=0.01 6.93 7.07 7.24 7.37 8.05 8.65 9.23 9.72 10.43
RANDBET0.025 p=0.1 7.02 7.13 7.31 7.41 7.98 8.48 9.00 9.65 10.32
RANDBET0.025 p=1 7.10 7.23 7.38 7.49 8.10 8.65 9.14 9.54 10.07
Table 20: Overall Robustness Results on CIFAR100. Tabular results corresponding to Fig. 7 and 11 for m = 8. We show
RErr for NORMAL, CLIPPING and RANDBET with various wmax and p across a subset of test bit error rates.
CIFAR100: summary results for m = 8 bit
Model Err
in %
RErr in %, p in % p=0.01
0.005 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.5 1
NORMAL 18.21 19.84 ±0.16 20.50 ±0.25 25.05 ±0.94 32.39 ±1.89 97.49 ±0.95 99.10 ±0.19
RQUANT 18.53 19.46 ±0.13 19.95 ±0.16 22.68 ±0.63 25.90 ±1.01 87.24 ±3.99 98.77 ±0.31
CLIPPING0.25 18.88 19.76 ±0.1 20.11 ±0.11 21.89 ±0.18 23.74 ±0.35 62.25 ±4.51 96.62 ±1.22
CLIPPING0.2 18.64 19.36 ±0.09 19.71 ±0.1 21.33 ±0.23 23.07 ±0.38 49.79 ±4.21 94.02 ±2.38
CLIPPING0.15 19.41 20.00 ±0.08 20.24 ±0.09 21.68 ±0.17 23.02 ±0.3 37.85 ±2.03 79.45 ±5.08
CLIPPING0.1 20.31 20.86 ±0.07 21.09 ±0.09 22.14 ±0.17 23.10 ±0.21 31.78 ±1.15 51.71 ±3.47
CLIPPING0.05 21.82 22.16 ±0.05 22.29 ±0.06 22.94 ±0.13 23.46 ±0.18 26.86 ±0.46 31.47 ±0.79
RANDBET0.1 p=0.01 19.68 20.21 ±0.08 20.46 ±0.09 21.52 ±0.17 22.56 ±0.25 30.59 ±0.82 48.93 ±3.31
RANDBET0.1 p=0.05 19.94 20.47 ±0.06 20.69 ±0.08 21.72 ±0.16 22.60 ±0.23 29.93 ±0.86 46.76 ±3.46
RANDBET0.1 p=0.1 19.18 19.67 ±0.06 19.86 ±0.07 20.87 ±0.12 21.69 ±0.21 28.03 ±0.74 41.29 ±2.81
RANDBET0.1 p=0.5 19.90 20.24 ±0.05 20.41 ±0.07 21.17 ±0.13 21.83 ±0.17 25.66 ±0.48 31.55 ±0.95
RANDBET0.1 p=1 21.08 21.43 ±0.05 21.59 ±0.07 22.24 ±0.13 22.76 ±0.15 25.73 ±0.33 29.31 ±0.56
RANDBET0.05 p=0.01 21.86 22.17 ±0.06 22.31 ±0.05 23.00 ±0.14 23.57 ±0.2 26.84 ±0.46 31.33 ±0.79
RANDBET0.05 p=0.05 20.97 21.30 ±0.05 21.44 ±0.07 22.12 ±0.14 22.72 ±0.16 25.95 ±0.34 30.14 ±0.59
RANDBET0.05 p=0.1 21.22 21.53 ±0.05 21.66 ±0.05 22.29 ±0.12 22.81 ±0.17 25.88 ±0.39 29.93 ±0.83
RANDBET0.05 p=0.5 21.29 21.55 ±0.04 21.65 ±0.06 22.13 ±0.12 22.60 ±0.15 25.01 ±0.3 27.70 ±0.5
RANDBET0.05 p=1 20.83 21.08 ±0.04 21.20 ±0.06 21.73 ±0.13 22.16 ±0.13 24.33 ±0.24 26.49 ±0.38
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Table 21: Overall Robustness Results on MNIST. Tabular results corresponding to Fig. 7 and 11 for m = 8, 4, 2 bits. We
show RErr for NORMAL, CLIPPING and RANDBET with various wmax and p across a subset of test bit error rates.
MNIST: summary results for m = 8,4,3 bit
Model Err
in %
RErr in %, p in % p=0.01
1 5 10 12.5 15 17.5 20
m = 8 bit
NORMAL 0.39 0.77 86.37 89.92 89.82 89.81 90.09 90.03
RQUANT 0.40 0.69 85.96 90.20 89.86 90.10 89.72 89.83
CLIPPING0.1 0.39 0.48 18.21 88.93 90.35 90.06 90.56 90.18
CLIPPING0.05 0.42 0.47 0.63 8.67 51.38 80.64 87.79 89.57
CLIPPING0.025 0.43 0.47 0.56 0.71 0.95 1.81 7.22 32.68
RANDBET0.1 p=1 0.36 0.44 3.41 86.29 89.05 89.85 90.10 89.93
RANDBET0.05 p=1 0.34 0.39 0.59 8.92 51.32 79.35 87.63 89.15
RANDBET0.05 p=5 0.34 0.38 0.50 1.02 5.12 41.31 79.19 87.88
RANDBET0.05 p=10 0.40 0.43 0.51 0.67 0.86 1.74 9.77 47.58
RANDBET0.05 p=15 0.39 0.40 0.45 0.56 0.64 0.78 1.10 2.72
RANDBET0.05 p=20 0.39 0.42 0.48 0.53 0.57 0.63 0.74 0.94
m = 4 bit
RQUANT 0.36 0.72 87.21 90.23 90.01 89.88 89.97 89.67
CLIPPING0.1 0.38 0.51 38.75 88.33 89.47 89.57 90.10 89.67
CLIPPING0.05 0.31 0.39 0.78 44.15 78.64 87.32 89.03 89.71
CLIPPING0.025 0.37 0.41 0.50 0.67 0.99 4.63 29.46 67.21
RANDBET0.1 p=1 0.38 0.48 13.29 87.43 89.70 89.63 89.41 90.02
RANDBET0.1 p=5 0.38 0.48 0.78 24.73 74.88 87.04 88.72 89.55
RANDBET0.1 p=10 0.40 0.47 0.64 1.22 2.62 16.72 64.33 83.80
RANDBET0.1 p=15 0.56 0.59 0.73 1.03 1.28 1.87 3.71 14.39
RANDBET0.1 p=20 0.56 9.48 14.29 7.39 6.07 5.80 6.10 8.12
RANDBET0.05 p=1 0.37 0.43 0.67 36.99 77.12 85.97 88.62 89.94
RANDBET0.05 p=5 0.38 0.42 0.53 1.38 12.90 60.73 83.69 88.75
RANDBET0.05 p=10 0.34 0.39 0.47 0.65 0.91 2.11 19.15 71.25
RANDBET0.05 p=15 0.37 0.39 0.43 0.52 0.63 0.79 1.17 3.16
RANDBET0.05 p=20 0.44 0.48 0.53 0.60 0.65 0.72 0.86 1.04
m = 2 bit
CLIPPING0.1 0.47 3.82 89.19 89.92 90.22 90.14
CLIPPING0.05 0.41 0.62 77.19 89.47 90.40 90.06
RANDBET0.05 p=3 0.47 0.53 1.36 82.71 88.66 90.28
RANDBET0.05 p=5 0.40 0.49 0.77 25.72 78.71 88.22
RANDBET0.05 p=10 0.40 0.45 0.58 0.94 1.82 15.70
RANDBET0.05 p=15 0.46 0.51 0.60 0.77 0.91 1.21
